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approach to the definition of a security, perhaps through legislation,
is preferable to the current case by case approach in the courts which
necessarily yields conflicting conclusions due to the subjective nature
of judicial analysis.
JEAN

II.

RULE 10b-5

A.

Purchaser-SellerRequirement

L. BYASSEE

The Supreme Court's 1975 decision in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores' firmly established the purchaser-seller requirement as a limitation on the class of plaintiffs entitled to sue under3
Rule 10b-5. 2 The purchaser-seller requirement, or Birnbaum Rule,
intra-corporation fiduciary duties traditionally governed by state law); Piper v. ChrisCraft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977) (no implied private right of action for damages
to tender offeror under § 14(e), '34 Act); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976) (cause of action Rule 10b-5 does not lie for mere negligence); United Housing
Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (definition of "securities" under the securities acts does not include units in private housing cooperative); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (standing for rule 10b-5 private action limited
to actual purchasers or sellers of securities).
1 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
2 SEC Rule 10b-5 was promulgated pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). Section 10(b) makes it:
unlawful for any person . . . [to use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
The purchaser-seller requirement was first formulated in Birnbaum v. Newport
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requires that the plaintiff allege fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security to have standing under Rule 10b-5.1 Prior
to the Blue Chip decision courts had not uniformly applied the
Birnbaum Rule, and a number of exceptions to the strict purchaserseller requirements arose. 5 In upholding the Birnbaum Rule the Court
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
The Birnbaum Rule has been sharply criticized as unnecessarily limiting the
useful potential of Rule 10b-5. See, e.g., A. JACOBS, THE IMPAcT OF RULE: 10b-5 (1976)
§ 38.01[d] [hereinafter cited as A. JACOBS]; Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum
Doctrine: A New Era For Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968). Application of the
requirement prior to Blue Chip ranged from rigid to extremely flexible. Compare
Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974)
(purchaser-seller requirement held an absolute prerequisite for Rule 10b-5 standing)
with Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) (purchaser-seller rule held not a prerequisite in the Seventh
Circuit).
5 Five principal exceptions to the Birnbaum Rule had developed prior to Blue
Chip, These were the injunctive relief exception, see, e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v.
Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); the forced seller exception, see, e.g., Vine
v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); the
derivative action exception, see, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970);
the aborted transaction exception, see, e.g., Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d
393 (9th Cir. 1973); and the de facto seller exception, see, e.g., James v. Gerber Prods.
Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973).
The injunctive relief exception applied when the plaintiff sought to enjoin future
or ongoing Rule 10b-5 violations rather than seeking equitable relief or damages for
past violations. The rationale for this exception was that the problems of proof of
damage which in part motivated the Birnbaum Rule were not present in an action for
injunctive relief and that less rigorous standards should be applied in order to effectuate the remedial aims of Rule 10b-5. The continued validity of this exception after
Blue Chip is unsettled. Blue Chip expressly imposed a purchaser-seller requirement
only in actions for damages. The Court's fear of vexatious litigation stemmed largely
from the in terrorumpotential of "strike" suits with settlement values dwarfing actual
damages. See note 9 infra. However, the thrust of Blue Chip is clearly an effort to stem
the flood of Rule 10b-5 litigation by limiting the class of plaintiffs, and courts may
therefore view claims for injunctive relief as an effort to evade the Supreme Court's
intended result. Compare Wright v. Heizer Corp., 411 F. Supp. 23 (N.D. Il. 1975)
(rejecting injunctive relief exception in light of Blue Chip) with Davis v. Davis, 526
F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1976) (upholding continued validity of injunctive relief exception).
See Bauman, The Future of Rule 10b-5: A Comment on Jacobs, The Impact of Rule
lob-5, 4 SEC. REG. L.J. 332, 338-39 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Bauman]; Rule lOb-5,
1975-1976 Securities Law Developments, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 935, 953-56 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as 1975-1976 Developments]. But cf. Jacobs, Standing to Sue Under
lob-5 After Blue Chip Stamps, 3 SEc. REG. L.J. 387, 401-03 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Jacobs]; Note, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores: Failure to Solve the
Purchaser-SellerProblem, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 965, 986-87 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Failure to Solve] (injunctive relief exception remains valid after Blue Chip!.
The forced seller exception applied when transactions such as a short form merger
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in Blue Chip failed to state whether the various exceptions to that
Rule remained valid.' The Blue Chip Court posed three principal
justifications for sustaining the Birnbaum Rule; the longstanding
judicial acceptance of the Rule,7 the conformity of a purchaser-seller
limitation on the plaintiff class under Rule 10b-5 with the statutory
language and legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ('34 Act),' and the danger of "strike" suits and vexatious litigation if the Birnbaum limitation were removed.' Courts applied the
or corporate liquidation converted the plaintiff's ownership interest into a claim for
cash. Although no actual sale by the plaintiff had occurred, courts applying this doctrine reasoned that, since the plaintiff would shortly be forced to accept cash for his
shares, requiring an actual sale as a condition for Rule 10b-5 standing was a "needless
formality." Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634 (2d Cir. 1967). For a discussion of the continued validity of the forced seller doctrine after Blue Chip see text
accompanying notes 69-79 infra. See also Jacobs, supra at 400.
The derivative action exception allowed a plaintiff who was not a purchaser or
seller to bring a derivative action, when the corporation had purchased or sold shares.
The validity of this exception does not appear to have been significantly affected by
Blue Chip. 421 U.S. at 737-38. The rationale for the affirmance of the Birnbaum Rule
is not disturbed by the continued existence of the derivative relief exception because
the remedy sought runs to the corporation, not to the individual shareholder who
caused the suit to be filed. See 1975-76 Developments, supra at 952-53.
The aborted transaction exception actually amounted to little more than recognition that plaintiffs claiming under contracts to purchase or sell securities fell within
the statutory definitions of purchase and sale §§ 3(a)(13) and 3(a)(14) '34 Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(13) and (14) (1970). See A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393
(2d Cir. 1967). After Blue Chip the exception has been strictly limited to such a
contractual context. See 1975-76 Developments supra at 956-57 n.114. See text accompanying notes 43-65 infra.
The de facto seller exception applied when the plaintiff was the beneficial owner
of shares bought or sold. See, e.g., James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir.
1973). The continued validity of this exception after Blue Chip is open to doubt. See
text accompanying notes 80-93 infra.
421 U.S. at 31-55.
, Id. at 731-33. The Court characterized the BirnbaumRule as having been upheld
by virtually all of the hundreds of reported cases considering Birnbaum in the quarter
century since that decision. In addition, the Court cited the failure of the SEC to
persuade Congress to alter the language of § 10(b) to bar fraud "in connection with
the purchase or sale of, or any attempt to purchase or sell, any security" (Court's
emphasis). Id. at 732, citing Hearingson S.1178-82 before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Banking & Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 367-68 (1959).
" 421 U.S. at 733-36. The Court emphasized that several provisions of the securities acts provide express private remedies for non-purchasers/sellers. Id. at 733, citing
§ 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970); § 5 of the '33
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970) and § 16(b) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). Had
Congress wished to provide a remedy to non-purchaser/sellers under § 10(b), the Court
reasoned, such an express provision could have been made.
1 421 U.S. at 737-49. The Court conceded that the statutory language and long-
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mandate of Blue Chip during the past year when considering what
sorts of transactions constituted purchases or sales of securities,' the
status of plaintiffs claiming contractual rights to purchase or sell
securities," and the effect of Blue Chip
on various of the pre-existing
12
exceptions to the Birnbaum Rule.
The Blue Chip Court relied in part on the statutory language of
the '34 Act to justify its limitation on the availability of a Rule 10b-5
cause of action. 3 However, the terms "purchase" and "sale" are not
defined in the '34 Act, " and Blue Chip provided no general guidelines
for the definition of these terms.'- Thus, whether a given transaction
constitutes the purchase or sale of securities continues to be settled
on a case-by-case basis" in view of the language of the '34 Act and
the policy thrust of Blue Chip. '" Two decisions in the last year have
contributed to this case-by-case definition of a purchase or sale of
securities.
standing judicial acceptance of the Birnbaum Rule would not by themselves, justify
the result in Blue Chip. However, the opinion posed a number of policy justifications
for the maintenance of the Birnbaum Rule which were viewed as determinative. Id.
These policy justifications were: (1) the potential for vexatious "strike" suits arising
out of the fact that a Rule 10b-5 action may have a settlement value to the plaintiff
completely out of proportion to its chances for success on the merits and may thus
disrupt normal business activity absent limits which allow for dismissal; (2) the possibilities for abuse of discovery rules in such strike suits; (3) the fact that, without the
Birnbaum Rule's imposition of the requirements of a sale transaction-an "objectively
demonstrable fact"-triers of fact in Rule 10b-5 cases would be left to rule on "many
rather hazy issues of historical fact" with no guidance other than the plaintiff's oral
testimony as to what he would have done in the absence of the fraud alleged.
" See text accompanying notes 13-42 infra.
See text accompanying notes 43-65 infra.
See text accompanying notes 66-92 infra.
See note 8 supra.
The appropriate definitional provisions of the '34 Act, §§ 3(a)(13) and (14), 15
U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(13) and (14) (1970) provide only that the terms "buy" and
"purchase" shall include contracts to acquire, and that the terms "sale" and "sell"
shall include contracts to dispose of securities. The definitions of purchase and sell are
treated by the '34 Act as matters of common knowledge.
"1 Blue Chip involved an offer to sell securities made pursuant to an antitrust
consent decree. 421 U.S. at 725-27. The plaintiff alleged that the prospectus which
accompanied this offer had been fraudulently pessimistic and that it had been induced
not to accept the offer by this unduly pessimistic prospectus. The Court's holding was
limited to a finding that, on those facts, the plaintiff did not meet the purchaser-seller
requirement. Id. at 731.
11The need to give substantive content to the terms "purchase" and "sale" did
not begin with Blue Chip. The existence of the Birnbaum Rule required courts to
struggle with the question of what is a purchase or sale of securities for more than
twenty years prior to Blue Chip. See A. JAcoBs, supra note 4, at § 38.02[b].
11See notes 7-9 supra.
'3
"
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In Mallis v. FDIC, 8 the Second Circuit held that a pledge of stock
as collateral for a loan is a sale of securities 19 and that fraud in connection with such a pledge gives rise to a cause of action under Rule 10b5.0 The plaintiffs in Mallis had taken a pledge of stock as security
for a loan.2 ' At the time of the pledge, the stock was held by defendant
Bankers Trust and was subject to an escrow agreement.2 2 Plaintiffs
sued after default on the loan, alleging that the defendant had violated Rule 10b-5 by knowingly misrepresenting that the stock was no
longer subject to the escrow agreement.3 The district court held that
the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring an action under Rule 10b-5
24
because no sale had occurred.
The Second Circuit reversed,2 stating that a pledgee takes an
investment risk identical to that taken by an investor 26 and that the
'1 [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,823 (2d Cir. Jan. 3,
1977), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3761 (U.S. May 24, 1977) (No. 76-1359).
11Id. at 90, 958.
Id. at 90,961-62.
at 90,959.
2 Id. Plaintiff's loan was made to two investors, Arnold and Fowler to enable them
to purchase certain shares of Equity National Industries, Inc. Title to these shares was
in Jerome and Judith Kates. However, the shares were in the possession of Banker's
Trust pursuant to a prior pledge by the Kates'. In addition, the shares were subject to
an escrow agreement which required that they be returned to Equity National for
cancellation or reissue depending on whether the corporation met specified earnings
conditions. The shares had already been called for cancellation at the time of the
pledge by Arnold and Fowler and the subsequent transactions which resulted in the
release of the shares by Banker's Trust and their transfer to Arnold and Fowler and
thence to plaintiff.
21 Id.

3

Id.

214407

F. Supp. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The district court relied on McClure v. First
Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975), which held
that a pledgor of securities might be liable under Rule 10b-5 after his default and a
consequent sale of the securities by the pledgee, but that the pledge itself did not
constitute a sale.
2 [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 95,823 (2d Cir. Jan. 3,
1977). The Mallis court saw the holding in United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 2651 (1976), as dispositive. Gentile held that a pledge of
stock was a sale in the context of a criminal prosecution under § 17(a) of the '33 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). The Mallis court saw no basis for treating the term "sale"
differently for purposes of a § 10(b) action. [1976- 1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 95,823 at 90,961. See generally A. JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 38.02[a]
& [b].
Z The court wrote:
In effect, the pledgee assumes a very real investment risk that the
pledged securities will have continuing value, a risk that is identical
in nature to the risk taken by investors which serves as the indisputable basis for statutory regulation of securities transactions. We there-
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policy objectives of Blue Chip would not be undermined by granting
standing to plaintiffs.Y The court of appeals saw no reason to expect
that its holding would lead to an increase in vexatious litigation
based solely on oral testimony-the prime fear of the Blue Chip.
Court.? In support of this holding, the court stated that a "pledge
which occurs pursuant to a loan is just as concrete a transaction as
is a normal transfer of title ' 29 and provides the "objectively demonstrable fact"3 that Blue Chip required for Rule 10b-5 standing.
In another recent case examining the purchaser-seller requirement, the District Court for the Southern District of New York employed analysis similar to that used in Mallis and held that a corporate "wind down" did not involve a purchase or sale of securities.3'
The case, Alpex Computer Corp. v. Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 32 involved an
unsuccessful joint venture between Alpex and Pitney-Bowes.3 The
joint venture had been pursued by means of a separate corporation,
PBA, Inc., which had issued all of its stock to the plaintiff and defendant.34 When the venture showed no prospects of success after-several
years, Pitney-Bowes used its controlling position to bring about a
wind down of PBA's corporate activities, leaving the joint venture
dormant but still in existence. 35 Alpex claimed that this wind down
fore find no reason to treat the equivalent risks differently under the
statute.
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,823 at 90,961, quoting
United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 467 (2d Cir. 1976).
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,823 at 90,961.
See 421 U.S. at 743-49; notes 8-9 supra.
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FE. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,823 at 90,962.
421 U.S. at 746-47.
" See Alpex Computer Corp. v. Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 328, 330
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). "Wind down" is an indefinite term, and the Alpex court provided
no definition. The term was used there to describe an action that causes a corporation
to cease operations but maintain its corporate existence. Thus, the term as used in
Alpex is analogous to a partial liquidation prior to dissolution. See H. HENN, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAw OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINEss ENTERPRISES

(2d Ed.) (1970) § 381

at 814-15.
417 F. Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).

* The two companies formed the joint venture to develop and market a computerized retail store cash register known as the SPICE system. Initially, Pitney-Bowes and
Alpex each owned a fifty per cent interest in PBA, Inc., the joint venture. However,

the initial agreement between the parties provided that Alpex would have operating
control of PBA. This agreement was revised as Pitney-Bowes provided the increasing
sums needed to shore up the venture, and Pitney-Bowes eventually attained complete

control and a sixty-four per cent ownership interest. Id. at 329.
Id.
Id. at 330. The wind down resolution directed PBA's officers to take appropriate
action, to the extent permitted by the company's resources, to conclude arrangements
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constituted a Rule 10b-5 violation which had damaged Alpex by converting its interest in a going concern to a worthless interest in a
dormant corporation." Alpex asserted that it had standing to make
this claim under the "forced seller" exception to the Birnbaum
Rule .3
While assuming the continued validity of the forced seller doctrine,"" the court held it inapplicable to a wind down because there
had been no termination of the plaintiffs interest, no liquidation of
the joint venture, and no conversion of the plaintiffs ownership interest into a claim for cash.3 9 Because these indicia of a forced sale
situation were absent, the court held that no sale had occurred and
that the plaintiffs consequently lacked standing to sue under Rule
10b-5. The Alpex court stated that such limitations were necessary
in order to prevent a flood of claims based on changes in corporate
operations involving no transfer of securities." Reasoning that Blue
Chip had'established that Rule 10b-5 does not reach such mismanagement claims, the court granted summary judgment to Pitney
Bowes.
The Mallis and Alpex decisions took a similar approach to defining a purchase or sale for Rule 10b-5 purposes. Both opinions first
examined the transactions involved to determine their similarity to
transactions already recognized as sales.4 Next, both opinions sought
guidance from the policy justifications offered by the Blue Chip Court
for the imposition of firm standing requirements: to limit Rule 10b-5
to its intended reach42 and to prevent a flood of vexatious litigation. 3
with customers, and to cancel, revise or fulfill any outstanding unfilled orders. After
the wind down was complete, PBA terminated its business activity but not its existence. At the time of the Alpex decision, PBA still owned its principal asset, the SPICE
system, and both parties still owned stock in PBA.
31Id. Alpex made two other claims under Rule 10b-5, involving alleged fraud in
the issuance of PBA's shares and the acquisition of control by Pitney-Bowes. However,
the court considered only plaintiff's third claim worthy of discussion.
31See note 5 supra; see also text accompanying notes 69-79 infra.
417 F. Supp. at 330. But see Gallagher, lOb-5 After Blue Chip Stamps: How
Stands the Judicial Oak, 80 DICK. L. REv. 1 36-37 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Gallagher].
31 417 F. Supp. at 330. Accord, Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973).
1"417 F. Supp. at 332. Accord, In re Penn Central Sec. Litigation, 494 F.2d 528,
534 (3d Cir. 1974), noted at 41 Mo. L. REv. 463 (1976).
" See text accompanying note 26 supra; 417 F. Supp. at 330-31.
'

See notes 7-8 supra.

See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra; 417 F. Supp. at 332; see generally R.
& H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th Ed.) (1970)
at 1034 [hereinafter cited as JENNINGS & MARSH].
'

JENNINGS

19771

SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS

This analysis appears well suited to achieve a definition of the
purchaser-seller requirement consonant with Blue Chip. In the context of complex transactions, "purchase" and "sale" are necessarily
indefinite terms. By considering both prior case law defining those
terms in various settings and the policy objectives of Blue Chip,
however, the Mallis and Alpex decisions point the way toward a
workable purchaser-seller requirement.
ContractualRights to Purchaseand Sell Securities
An additional factor complicating the application of the
purchaser-seller requirement is the fact that the '34 Act expressly
provides that the terms "purchase" and "sale" shall include contracts for the purchase and sale of securities." Thus, an allegation of
fraud in connection with a contract to purchase or sell securities falls
45
within the Birnbaum Rule and states a claim under Rule 10b-5.
However, the '34 Act does not define the exact nature of the contractual right required to meet the purchaser-seller requirement and thus
confer standing under Rule 10b-5. Thus, courts faced with claims
resting on allegations of fraud in connection with contracts to purchase or sell securities must look elsewhere for guidance as to whether
a sufficient contractual right is present. State contract law provides
a potential source for such guidance. Two recent cases-reached conflicting results as to the applicability of state contract law to cases
involving the purchaser-seller requirement.
Ohashi v. Verit Industries, Inc.46 involved a contract for the sale
of securities which remained executory by virtue of the defendant's
failure to perform a covenant of good faith implied by state law. The
Ninth Circuit held that fraud in connection with such a contract can
support a Rule 10b-5 claim. 4 The plaintiff in Ohashi had purchased
restricted shares of the defendant's stock. The contract under which
the shares were purchased provided that the shares could not be
transferred without the defendant's express consent and an opinion
from its counsel that such transfer would not violate the securities
laws. 8 The defendant fraudulently withheld the required consent and
opinion as part of a scheme to keep the market price of defendant's
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) & (14) (1970) ('34 Act §§ 3(a)(13) and (14)).
See A. JAcows, supra note 4, at § 38.02[b].
' 536 F.2d 849 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3411 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976) (No.
76-254).
"

"

11536 F.2d at 853-54.
18Id. at 852.
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stock artificially high. 9
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
plaintiff's claims based on his inability to transfer the shares. The
appellate court ruled that the Birnbaum Rule foreclosed recovery for
claims founded on such "non-sales."5 The contract under which the
plaintiff had purchased the shares appeared to be fully performed,
the transfer of the shares to the plaintiff and payment to the defendant having occurred. 5' However, the court ruled that performance of
the stock sale contract was not completed by transfer of shares to the
plaintiff. 52 The plaintiff could not get the full benefit of his bargain
until the restrictions on the transfer of the shares were removed. The
court, applying California law, held that the defendant had an implied duty to deal in good faith and thus could not take any action
that would prevent full performance of the contract.53 The defendant's fraudulent scheme breached this covenant, and the contract
thus remained executory while the scheme was carried out.54 The
court then found that the misrepresentations that rendered the contract executory were tied to the market manipulations that caused
the plaintiffs damages. 5 Thus, in the court's opinion, the plaintiff
met the purchaser-seller requirement and stated a cause of action
5
under Rule 10b-5. 1
While the Ohashi court applied state contract law to determine
whether a contract for the purchase or sale of securities was present
11Id. Defendant in Ohashi allegedly used false assurances that it would perform
its agreement to remove the restrictions on transfer of the shares to mollify the plaintiff, thereby preventing the plaintiff from taking independent action to secure removal
of the restrictions. The plaintiff eventually secured a "no action" letter from the SEC
and was able to get the transfer restrictions removed. However, by the time the plaintiff was able to transfer his shares the price had fallen from a high of $14 per share to
$1.50 per share.
0 Id. at 852-53.
51 Id.

52 Id.

at 853.

Id., citing Crail v. Blakely, 8 Cal. 3d 744, 749-50, 106 Cal. Rptr. 187, 191, 505
P.2d 1027 (1973); 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw § 6 (8th ed. 1973). But see
1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 14 (3d ed. 1957).
5'536 F.2d at 853.
55Id. The court was careful to state that not every nonperformance of a contractual covenant in a contract for the purchase or sale of securities will support a Rule
10b-5 claim. Which breaches would support such claims, the court held, was to be
determined using a facts and circumstances test. The facts alleged in Ohashi, involving
breach of a contractual covenant as a means to further a scheme of market manipulations, clearly stated a Rule 10b-5 claim, citing 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD
-SEC RULE 10b-5, § 4.6(230), at 82.1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as A. BROMBERG].
11

536 F.2d at 854.
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to confer Rule 10b-5 standing, a contrasting application of state contract law was made in Desser v. A'shton. 51 The court in Desser declined to apply the state statute of frauds to bar a plaintiff claiming
59
8
under an oral contract. Citing the "broad remedial purposes" of
Rule 10b-5, the court held that- the nonenforceability of a contract
under state law was not determinative for purposes of assessing the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's allegation of a Rule 10b-5 claim.
The contrast between the Ohashi and Desser courts' application
of state law suggests the possibility that courts may still use their
power to fashion remedies when exercising federal question jurisdiction"0 as a means of applying the purchaser-seller requirement as the
equities of each case seem to dictate. Such a result is questionable
in view of the policy position of Blue Chip which clearly defined
limits to the class of potential Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs in order to avoid
vexatious litigation.' Thus, while both the Ohashi and Desser courts
recognized the plaintiffs' Rule 10b-5 claims, the analysis in Ohashi
seems more tenable. The clear import of Blue Chip is that settled
rules limiting the reach of Rule 10b-5 are necessary and that the preBlue Chip flexible approach to Rule 10b-5 was erroneous." State
57408 F. Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), noted at 28 U. FLA. L. Ray. 858 (1976).
Desser was decided subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Blue Chip and
appears less consistent with the thrust of that case than does Ohashi. See text accompanying notes 58-61 infra.
408 F. Supp. at 1176-77. The plaintiff in Desserclaimed that he had surrendered
confidential information in consideration for the defendant's oral promise to transfer
securities to plaintiff, thereby allegedly creating a contract for the sale of securities.
The parties stipulated that no transfer ever took place. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant entered into the contract with the intention of not performing, thereby
violating Rule 10b-5. See 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 858, 859-60 (1976).
5, 408 F. Supp. at 1176. The Desser court did not discuss the possibility that Blue
Chip had altered the historically flexible construction of Rule 10b-5. See Bauman,
supra note 4, at 340-42. The Desser court's only discussion of Blue Chip was an effort
to distinguish the Desser plaintiff's obvious need to rely on oral testimony from the
Blue Chip Court's strong rejection of the validity of claims based on such testimony
under Rule 10b-5. The Desser court reasoned that Blue Chip was inapposite because
the plaintiff could confirm his oral testimony with additionaloral testimony. Given
the Supreme Court's fundamental assertion that Rule 10b-5 claims must rest on at
least one objectively demonstrable fact, see note 9 supra, the Desser court's reasoning
is not persuasive. See 28 U. FLA. L. Rav. 858, 864 (1976).
See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Mishkin, The Variousness
of "FederalLaw:" Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State
Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. Ray. 797, 802-03 (1957).
" See notes 7-9 supra.
62 See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
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contract law provides a settled body of precedent for guidance in
determining the existence of necessary contractual rights for the purchase and sale of securities. The Ohashi court's application of this
settled body of precedent is thus consistent with the Blue Chip policy
of establishing clear limiting rules as to standing. By contrast, the
Desser court's continued adherence to the pre-Blue Chip flexible view
of rules limiting the availability of Rule 10b-5 remedies appears inconsistent with the Supreme Court's mandate in Blue Chip.
The problem of contractual rights and the purchaser-seller requirement also arose in Camp v. Genesco, Inc.6" There, the court
dealt with the question of whether fraud in connection with retained
contractual rights, as opposed to fraud in connection with the creation of contractual rights, 4 can give rise to a Rure 10b-5 cause of
action. The plaintiffs in Camp owned convertible securities of Genesco. They alleged that the defendant fraudulently induced them
not to exercise their conversion rights and sued for damages under
Rule 10b-5.65 The court rejected defendant's argument that only
plaintiffs who have been fraudulently induced to enter into contracts
for the purchase or sale of securities have standing under the
Birnbaum Rule. The court relied on the definitional provisions of the
'34 Act and language in Blue Chip to hold that the plaintiffs had
stated a claim under Rule 10b-5.66 This analysis is consistent with the
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,679 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
6, 1976).
64 See text accompanying notes 48-58 supra.
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,679 at 90,336.
' The Camp court stated,
the holders of. . .options, and other contractual rights or duties to
purchase or sell securities have been recognized as 'purchasers' or
'sellers' of securities for purposes of Rule 10b-5, not because of a judicial conclusion that they were similarly situated to 'purchasers' or
'sellers', but because the definitional provisions of the 1934 Act themselves grant them such a status.
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,679 at 90,337, quoting Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 751 (1975).
The Third Circuit similarly focused on the existence of a contractual right as the
central issue in determining whether the purchaser-seller requirement had been met
in Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 540 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1976). In Tully, the plaintiffs
claimed that they had been fraudulently denied their contractual right of first refusal
of shares of the defendant. The plaintiffs, Class A shareholders of defendant, sought
injunctive relief claiming that defendant had offered Class A treasury shares to all
classes of shareholders on an equal basis in breach of a restrictive stock agreement
requiring that any such offer first be made to Class A shareholders. The offer was the
result of machinations by Class C shareholders directed towards reducing the control
exercised by Class A shareholders. All Class A shareholders were subject to a restrictive
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Blue Chip Court's policy objectives and fidelity to statutory language. The '34 Act does not distinguish between retained contractual
rights and the creation of contractual rights for purposes of defining
a contract for the purchase or sale of securities. Further, a retained
contractual right such as a put, call, option, or the conversion right
involved in Camp provides the objectively demonstrable fact sought
by the Blue Chip Court as a check on vexatious litigation.
Exceptions to the Purchaser-SellerRequirement
The continued validity of the various judicially created exceptions
to the Birnbaum Rule was not discussed by the Blue Chip Court."
Courts in the past year, however, addressed and upheld two of these
exceptions, the forced seller" and the de facto seller" doctrines.
stock agreement that forbade transfer of any Class A shares unless they were first
offered to the other Class A shareholders at book value or $100 per share, whichever
was higher. However, the offer which gave rise to the Tully litigation was an offer of
treasury shares held by the corporation and not by aClass A shareholder subject to
the restrictive stock agreement. 540 F.2d at 192-93. Focusing on this act, the Third
Circuit held that plaintiff's contractual right of first refusal did not extend to the
shares at issue in Tully. Thus, unlike the plaintiffs in Camp, who had contractual
conversion rights, the plaintiffs in Tully lacked any entitlement to purchase shares
under the express terms of the agreement relied upon. Because the plaintiffs lacked a
contractual right to purchase or sell securities, the Third Circuit held that they could
not state a Rule 10b-5 claim. 540 F.2d at 193.
The analysis employed by the Camp and Tully courts is consistent with Blue Chip
as well as with pre-Blue Chip decisions holding that plaintiffs claiming on the basis of
contractual rights to purchase or sell securities meet the purchaser-seller requirement.
See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 751 (1975); Fenstermacher v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 333, 336 n.4 (3d Cir. 1974); Walling v.
Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393, 396 n.5 (9th Cir. 1973).
1 See notes 6-8 supra.Likewise, the Blue Chip Court failed to deal expressly with
the continued validity of the approach of those courts which had treated Birnbaum
not as a rigid rule of standing but rather as a policy decision to limit antifraud litigation by limiting the class of potential plaintiffs. See, e.g., James v. Gerber Prods. Co.,
483 F.2d 944, 948 (6th Cir. 1973); Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417
F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970); Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F.
Supp. 958, 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The clear implication of Blue Chip's affirmance of
Birnbaum, however, was that a measure of rigidity had been added to the purchaserseller requirement. Thus, the fate of the various judicially created exceptions to the
Birnbaum Rule was open to doubt. See text accompanying notes 1-6 supra; compare
Jacobs, supra note 5, and Failure to Solve, supra note 5, with Bauman, supra note 5;
and Rule 10b-5, Survey of 1974 Securities Law Developments, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
719, 742-50 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Developments].
B,

See note 5 supra.
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The decision in Singer v. Magnavox Company70 affirmed the vitality of the forced seller exception after Blue Chip. The plaintiffs in
Singer alleged that the defendant had employed proxy materials
which contained material misrepresentations and omissions to effectuate a two-step takeover of Magnavox. 7' Plaintiffs sought rescission
or, in the alternative, damages." The plaintiffs had not sold their
shares in Magnavox but claimed that the effect of the imminent short
form merger 73 would be to convert their ownership interest into a
claim for a grossly inadequate amount of cash, 74 the gravamen of a
claim under the forced seller doctrine. 75 The Singer court did not
analyze the effect of Blue Chip on this claim, but merely cited several
pre-Blue Chip cases for the proposition that the plaintiff had
"clearly" stated a claim under Rule 10b-5. 71
70

[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)

95,830 (D. Del. Jan.

4, 1977).
1I The takeover in Singer was to be achieved by forming a Delaware shell corporation to make a tender offer for the shares of Magnavox. Control gained by means of
the tender offer would then be used to authorize the creation of a wholly owned
subsidiary, and a subsequent freeze out merger of Magnavox into the subsidiary would
eliminate the rest of the shareholders. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,830 at 90,993-94. A freeze out merger, as the term applies to Singer, is a
contrived merger with a shell corporation created solely for the purpose of the merger.
The terms of such mergers commonly provide that the "frozen out" minority shareholders will receive senior securities or cash in exchange for their common stock. The
effect is to terminate the ownership interest of the minority and give total control of
the corporation to the insiders who effected the freeze out. See generally Brudney, A
Note on "Going Private," 61 VA. L. Rav. 1019, 1020-21 (1975); Note, Going Private,
84 YALE L.J. 903, 910-11 (1975).
72 [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,830 at 90,994. The
plaintiffs in Singer placed primary reliance on the principle, first enunciated in Green
v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 97 S.Ct. 1292 (1977) and
Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 97 S.
Ct. 228 (1976), that a freeze out merger without a legitimate corporate purpose is a
per se violation of Rule 10b-5. See Part E, infra. The Singer court expressly refrained
from deciding this question, although it doubted the validity of the Green-Marshel
rule. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,830 at 90,995.
13 See note 70 supra. The freeze out merger in Singer was to have been carried out
under the Delaware short form merger statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1974 and
Cum. Supp. 1976) (parent corporation owning at least 90% of subsidiary's stock may
merge with subsidiary upon resolution of parent's board and shareholders; no notice
to or consent of minority shareholders required).
11 [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,830 at 90,995-96.
15See note 5 supra.
76 [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,830 at 90,996. The
court relied on Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967) (see note 5 supra)
and Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965), which
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A more complete analysis of the basis for the survival of the forced
seller doctrine would have been desirable and arguably would have
led to the same result. Granting standing to a forced seller does not
undermine the policy objectives of Blue Chip and is not necessarily
barred by the Blue Chip Court's careful attention to statutory definitions.17 Indeed, the Blue Chip opinion cited a leading forced seller
case, Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co.,"5 albeit for another proposition,
but without suggesting that the holding in Vine was invalid.79 The
Court's benign treatment of the forced seller exception permits the
inference that the exception remains valid.8
A second exception to the Birnbaum Rule was involved in
Klamberg v. Roth.' In that case the court, citing pre-Blue Chip cases
as authority,"2 upheld the de facto seller exception in denying a motion to dismiss a Rule 10b-5 claim by a beneficiary of a trust against
the trustee." The court relied on language in the Blue Chip opinion
held that an allegation of a fraudulent scheme which results in a compelled sale of
securities at an inadequate price states a Rule 10b-5 cause of action.
" The forced seller exception rests on the proposition that an actual sale by the
plaintiff is, under the circumstances, a needless formality. See note 5 supra.The policy
objectives of Blue Chip are not thwarted by giving standing to forced sellers. The
imminent, inevitable sale by the plaintiff provides the "objectively demonstrable fact"
required by Blue Chip and eliminates the danger of vexatious strike suits based on oral
testimony about hypothetical situations that provided the major policy impetus for the
Blue Chip Court's affirmance of Birnbaum. See Failureto Solve, supra note 5, at 98789; but see Gallagher, supra note 38, at 36-37.
7' 374 F.2d at 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
7' 421 U.S. at 746-47 n.10. The Blue Chip Court cited Vine for the proposition that
limitations on Rule 10b-5 actions proposed by the SEC were not adequate to deal with
the adverse effects which would flow from the elimination of Birnbaum.
The weakness of the Singer court's analysis stems neither from its reliance on
Vine, nor from its result, which is defensible in light of Blue Chip, but rather from the
failure to discuss the impact of Blue Chip on the facts before it. No analysis of a
purchaser-seller question which fails to discuss the policy thrust of Blue Chip can be
considered an adequate treatment of the issues, regardless of the result.
See Jacobs, supra note 5; Failure to Solve, supra note 5; but see Gallagher,
supra note 38.
11[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,747 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
20, 1976).
$1The Klamberg court relied in part on James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944
(6th Cir. 1973), the pre-Blue Chip case that established the de facto seller exception.
As in Singer, the inadequacy of the Klamberg court's analysis is not its reliance on
pre-Blue Chip cases per se, but rather its failure to reevaluate the adequacy of those
cases as precedent in light of the policy objectives set forth in Blue Chip.
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,747 at 90,629. The
plaintiffs in Klamberg were employees of A. Sandler Co. and beneficiaries of its profit
sharing retirement plan. The complaint alleged that Kayser-Roth Co., which had
acquired A. Sandier Co. in 1969, had replaced the trustees of the retirement plan. The
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which it argued supported the continuation of the policy of flexible
interpretation of the Birnbaum Rule as the basis for justifying its
continued adherence to the de facto seller doctrine. 4 Reasoning that
the plaintiffs, while not the nominal sellers of the stock, were the
parties most directly affected by the sale, the court held that a Rule
85
10b-5 cause of action had been stated.
This result is difficult to support in light of the similarity of the
plaintiff's position to that of the plaintiff in Blue Chip. In both cases
the plaintiffs had not bought or sold any stock and lacked a contractual right to buy or sell stock. 6 The sale of stock by either plaintiff
was neither imminent nor unavoidable and thus a needless formality
as in a forced seller situation.17 The Klamberg court's confidence that
Blue Chip allowed a continuation of a flexible approach to the
Birnbaum Rule is questionable given the tone of the Blue Chip opinion." The Blue Chip Court paid careful attention to the statutory
language of the '34 Act and emphasized the need to limit the reach
of Rule 10b-5.89 A de facto sale clearly does not fall within the statutory definitions of purchase and sale,9" and there is no apparent justification for overriding these definitions in a de facto seller case." The
new trustees, plaintiffs claimed, had placed 70% of the fund's assets in Kayser-Roth
stock where they remained despite a steady decline in the market price of Kayser-Roth
stock. The plaintiffs claimed that the value of the fund had decreased by 50% as a
result of the trustees' action.
81The Klamberg court stated that, "[t]he Blue Chip Court recognized that 'the
Birnbaum rule has been flexibly interpreted by lower federal courts', without commenting either pro or con on these decisions." [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 95,747 at 90,630 n.1., quoting 421 U.S. at 751.
11 Id. at 90,631.
86 Compare 421 U.S. at 726-27 with [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,747 at 90,629.
81 See note 76 supra.
Is See notes 7-9 supra. The entire Blue Chip opinion evinced a desire to limit the
expansion of Rule 10b-5 litigation by elevating the purchaser-seller requirement to a
strict rule of standing. Thus, the Supreme Court's failure to comment on the pre-Blue
Chip pattern of flexible application of Birnbaum, see note 83 supra, hardly seems a
conclusive justification for continuing that pattern unexamined.
0 See notes 7-9 supra.
0 A de facto seller has no contractual rights entitling him to purchase or sell
securities and has not himself purchased or sold securities. See note 5 supra.
"1 A de facto seller has a state law remedy for breach of fiduciary duty. See note
92 infra. Thus, given the mandate of Blue Chip limiting the availability of a Rule 10b5 cause of action, elimination of de facto seller standing under Rule 10b-5 appears
justified. A contrary result would lead to what has been termed the anomaly of trying
to "jigsaw" all manner of transactions into Rule 10b-5 because of the fortuitous, tangential involvement of a sale of securities. See Cary, Federalismand Corporate Law:
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plaintiff in a de facto seller situation has recourse to the state courts
for an action founded on the trustee's breach of his fiduciary obligation." There, is no reason to suspect that this is an inadequate remedy. 3 Given the lack of policy justifications for breaking with the
Blue Chip doctrine of strict adherence to the statutory language of
the securities acts, the continued validity of the de facto seller exception seems doubtful. 4 Thus, the result in Klamberg is apparently an
improper application of Blue Chip and a misstatement of the current
status of the de facto seller exception.
B.

Reliance

The reliance element of a private Rule 10b-5 cause of action serves
to establish a causal link between the defendant's violation of the rule
and the plaintiff's harm." Courts have adopted varying approaches
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 700 (1974) [hereinfater cited as Cary].
But see Gallagher, supra note 38. Professor Gallagher argues that de facto seller standing should continue to be allowed because a sale of securities which can be established
by documentary proof has occurred and because the plaintiff has a sufficient economic
interest to eliminate the possibility of vexatious litigation from an indeterminate class
of plaintiffs. Analysis focusing on what is being attacked in a de facto seller situation
provides the answer to this contention. A Rule 10b-5 plaintiff claiming purchaser-seller
status under the de facto seller exception has beenharmed by a breach of fiduciary
duty by the trustee, not by manipulation in the sale of stock. To allow a federal cause
of action because securities are tangentially involved is to confuse categories. The
transaction should be attacked in a state court action for breach of a fiduciary duty
because of its unfairness, not in a Rule 10b-5 action because the fiduciary's wrongdoing
happened to be accomplished by means of a securities transaction. This position is
consistent with the Supreme Court's recent emphasis on removing matters
"traditionally relegated to state law" from the class of permissible claims under the
securities laws. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 97 S.Ct. 1292 (1977) (breach of
majority shareholders' fiduciary duty to minority); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
97 S.Ct. 926 (1977) (no implied private right of action for damages to tender offeror
under § 14(e), '34 Act, in part because claim traditionally available under state law).
,1 Because of the availability of a well developed state law remedy based upon the
law of fiduciary obligations, application of the limiting policy of Blue Chip to the class
of de facto sellers is appropriate.'Plaintiffs in this class will not be deprived of a remedy
and needless complication of the Rule 10b-5 area will be avoided.
11 The alleged inadequacy of appropriate state remedies provided part of the justification for recent decisions by the Second Circuit expanding the reach of Rule 10b-5
in the area of going private transactions. See, e.g., Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533
F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 97 S.Ct. 1292 (1977). However, the remedies available
to de facto sellers in state courts do not suffer from the defects which the Second
Circuit saw in state appraisal actions available to shareholders "frozen out" in going
private transactions. See Part E infra.
'4 See 1974 Developments, supra note 671, at 745.
See generally 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 55, at §§ 8.6, 8.7; 5 A. JACOBS, supra
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to the concepts of "causation" and "reliance," often either using the
terms interchangeably"6 or implying that they represent distinct elements of the plaintiffs case. 7 This confusion in terminology has obscured the essential question addressed by both "reliance" and
"causation"-whether the defendant's violation is causally linked to
the plaintiff's harm. 8
This difficulty has its origins in the development of a judicially
implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5." The courts naturally attempted to define the scope and elements of private Rule 10b5 actions by looking for guidance to analogous common law actions.'
Given the use of terms such as "fraud" and "misrepresentation" in
Rule 10b-5, courts adopted the common law torts of deceit and misrepresentation as appropriate analogs."' The elements of those torts
required a showing of justifiable reliance by the plaintiff as the means
of establishing causation in fact."2 Thus, courts faced with private
Rule 10b-5 actions tended to frame their discussion of causation in
terms of the plaintiff's "reliance" upon the misrepresentation or
note 4, at §§ 64.01, 64.02; Note, Reliance Under Rule lOb-5: Is the "Reasonable Investor" Reasonable?, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 562 (1972); Note, The Reliance Requirement in
PrivateActions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 HAxv. L. REv. 584 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Reliance Requirement].
" See, e.g., Harnett v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 496 F.2d 832, 836 n.12 (3d Cir. 1974);
Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 797 (2d Cir. 1969); List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
," See, e.g., Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1976); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
474 F.2d 514, 517-18 (10th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874
(1973); Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
" See JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 43, at 1064.
'9 Neither section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 expressly provide for a private right of
action. The legislative history is also silent on this subject. See Bromberg, Are There
Limits to Rule 10b-5?, 29 Bus. LAW. 167, 167 (1974). However, such a right was implied
in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802-03 (E.D. Pa. 1947). The
Supreme Court affirmed the existence of a private right of action under Rule 10b-5 in
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
10 See 3 L. Loss, SEcuRrriEs REGULATION, at 1430-34 (2d ed. 1961).
I"1
See Note, The Nature and Scope of the Reliance Requirement in PrivateActions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 363, 366-70 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as PrivateActions].
"I2The elements of a prima facie case of common law deceit are: (1) a false
representation by the defendant, (2) knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant
that the representation is false, (3) an intention by the defendant to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting in reliance on the representation, (4) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff, (5) damage to the plaintiff caused by such reliance. W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER].
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omission involved.' ° Courts have not, however, merely treated Rule
10b-5 as a codification of common law deceit, despite their occasionally confusing adherence to the terminology of the common law.
Rather, recognition of the broad corrective and preventative aims of
the Rule has led courts to abandon a strict adherence to common law
doctrine in defining the nature of the causal link required to state a
Rule 10b-5 claim.' 04
The leading example of this judicial modification of the common
law in delineating the causation requirement in Rule 10b-5 actions is
the Supreme Court's decision in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States."'5 In that case, the defendant withheld material information
from plaintiffs in a face-to-face securities transaction.' Reversing a
lower court decision which had found the plaintiffs failure to demonstrate reliance determinative,0 7 the Court held that the plaintiffs
need only demonstrate that the information was material in order to
state a Rule 10b-5 claim.' The Court stated that the abrogation of
the requirement of positively demonstrating reliance was necessary
where the fraud alleged involves "primarily failure to disclose."'0 , By
1n See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972);
Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 288-91 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 874 (1972); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom. 422 F.2d 221, 231 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965).
NI Courts are not bound by the common law when implying private rights of
action from federal regulatory statutes. See Reliance Requirement, supra note 95, at
585. Thus, the case law defining the scope of private actions under Rule 10b-5 has gone
beyond its origins in the common" law of deceit. See Private Actions, supra note 101,
at 366-88.
"'

406 U.S. 128 (1972).

Plaintiffs in Affiliated Ute were unsophisticated Ute Indians. The defendants
were sophisticated investors easily capable of taking advantage of the "not-soknowledgeable" plaintiffs. 3 A. BROMBERG, supra note 55, at § 8.6 (New Matter). The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants has purchased securities from them without
disclosing that defendants were engaged in selling those shares at substantially higher
prices in a secondary market. 406 U.S. at 144-47.
"I Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337, 1348 (10th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom.
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
O

MI406 U.S. at 153-54.
I Id. at 153. The common law had some difficulty with the concept of even
finding liability for deceit based on nondisclosures largely because of the old tort rule
that nonfeasance will not support liability. See, e.g., Swinton v. Whitinsville. Say.
Bank, 311 Mass. 677, 42 N.E. 2d 808 (1942). This rule was judicially altered, however,
to require a defendant who made some representation to disclose sufficient information
to prevent his representation from being misleading. Thus, an action for deceit based
on nondisclosure would generally lie at common law. However, the common law has
never inferred the reliance element of a deceit cause of action from the materiality of
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this, the Court recognized the virtually insurmountable proof problems imposed upon a plaintiff if he is required to prove that he would
have relied on undisclosed information had he known it."' The Court
avoided this difficulty by defining material information as information upon which a reasonable investor would rely"' and held that the
plaintiff need only demonstrate that the information he was denied
was of this nature.
While Affiliated Ute greatly eased the burden of plaintiffs claiming under Rule 10b-5," 2 a number of questions as to its applicability
in variant factual situations remain unanswered. Specifically, the
impact of the opinion on open market as opposed to face-to-face
securities transactions was not clear."' Further, the Affiliated Ute
Court did not treat the question of whether the defendant could rebut
the presumption of reliance raised by a showing of material nondisclosures."4
the undisclosed information as did Affiliated Ute. PROSSER, supra note 102, § 106 at
695-99.
"0 See 406 U.S. at 153-54, Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir.
1975). A. BROMBERO, supra note 55, § 8.6 at 212; 29 VAND. L. Rav. 287, 291 (1976).
"1 406 U.S. at 153-54. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
"I See Stoll, Reliance as an Element in 10b-5 Actions, 53 ORE. L. REv. 169, 17477 (1974); Reliance Requirement, supra note 95, at 586-87. Cf. Mills v. Electric AutoLite, Inc., 396 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1970) (plaintiff not required to show a substantial
effect on voting where proxy statements contained material omissions and misrepresentations).
"I The chain of causation linking the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's harm
in an open market situation bears no relation to the plaintiff's own reliance. Rather,
his damage is caused by the effect that the deception has on the market during the
period in which the plaintiff trades. A. BROMBERG, supra note 55, § 8.6 at 212. This is
the so-called "fraud on the market" theory of causation. See A. BROMBERG, supra §
8.7(2), at 217-18. Additionally, the definition of the applicable trading period in determining the class of potential plaintiffs presents some difficulties. See text accompanying notes 157-67 infra. Assuming that these difficulties can be overcome, where the
plaintiff establishes that the information in question was material, the logical inference
is that the defendant's conduct would affect a sufficient number of reasonable investom to produce a market impact causing the plaintiff's harm. However, courts have
reached inconsistent results on this question. Compare Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d
891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 57 (1976) (proof of reliance unnecessary),
noted at 29 VAND. L. Rav. 287 (1976), with Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 517-21 (10th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam) (reliance
must be shown in open market transaction; Affiliated Ute not discussed) and ChrisCraft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1128, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
rev'd, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 and id. at 924 (1973) (plaintiff
must objectively demonstrate that some actual investors relied).
'" See, e.g., Chelsea Assoc. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266, 1271-72 (6th Cir. 1975);
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The first of these unsettled issues, the application of Affiliated
Ute to open market transactions, raises a number of difficult problems. If the effect of Affiliated Ute is to allow a showing of materiality
to raise a rebuttable presumption of reliancel 5 and therefore causation,"' it is difficult to determine how a defendant would rebut the
presumption in an open market setting."' Further, if Affiliated Ute
extends to open market transactions and thus allows any investor
who traded in a stock without the benefit of full or accurate information to make use of the reliance presumption, the potential exists for
very large
damage awards, due to the number of potential plain8

tiffs."

The Second Circuit faced these issues in its 1974 decision in
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491
F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1974) (presumption of reliance held to be rebuttable). One
difficulty raised by terming the Affiliated Ute presumption rebuttable is that where
the plaintiff's claim is based on omissions, a defendant seeking to rebut the presumption would face the same proof problems that justified the Affiliated Ute rule in the
first place. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
An additional question left open by the Affiliated Ute Court was whether the
Court had eliminated the requirement of proving reliance only for plaintiffs alleging
material omissions. 406 U.S. at 153-54. The general rule that has emerged in cases
subsequent to Affiliated Ute is that the presumption of reliance from a showing of
materiality is applicable only in nondisclosure as opposed to misrepresentation cases.
Reliance Requirement, supra note 95, at 606.
Some courts have stated, however, that the effect of Affiliated Ute is to abolish
the reliance requirement in all Rule 10b-5 actions. Allen Organ Co. v. North Am.
Rockwell Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1117, 1127 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Cases within the last year
have exhibited a continued uncertainty on this issue. Compare McClean v. Alexander,
420 F. Supp. 1057, 1076 (D.Del. 1976) (presumption of reliance extends only to nondisclosure) with Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,683 at 90,367 (E.D. Tenn. May 19, 1976) (dictum)
(Affiliated Ute applicable to both misrepresentations and omissions).
"I See 29 VAND.L. REv. 287, 290 (1976) (presumption established byAffiliated Ute
is rebuttable by an affirmative showing of lack of causation).
' See text accompanying note 114 supra.
" The defendant in an open market Rule 10b-5 case is faced with a large number
of potential plaintiffs. Because of the nature of the causal chain in an open market
case, see note 113 supra, the defendant would have to present objective evidence that
an insufficient number of investors relied on any alleged misrepresentation to affect
the market, normally an impossible burden.
I' See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (1968) (Friendly, C.J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Recent cases limiting the use of class
actions have reduced the potential liability somewhat. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
However, the sheer number of potential plaintiffs involved means that even a series of
individual actions could result in very large cumulative liability for Rule 10b-5 defendants.
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Shapiro v. MerrillLynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith, Inc." The Shapiro
court held that the Affiliated Ute rule was applicable to a case involving trading on a national securities exchange. 2 The violation alleged
in Shapiro was that Merrill Lynch, as underwriters of a new stock
issue, had come into possession of material adverse earnings information about the issuer.'12 Merrill Lynch had not traded in the stock of
the issuer but had allegedly failed to make the information public,
while at the same time "tipping" certain of its customers.122 The
"tippee" customers had taken advantage of the information by selling their shares of the issuer before the earnings estimates became
public and damaged the value of the stock.'2 The plaintiffs24 had
purchased the stock while the earnings information was still secret
and had subsequently seen the value of the stock decline considerably
after publication of the earnings information.'
The court, rejecting defendant's contention that Affiliated Ute
was applicable only in face-to-face transactions, held that the nature
of the transaction is not determinative.'2 Rather, given the aim of the
securities laws to protect the integrity of securities markets by insuring that all investors trade on the basis of equal information," the
495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
Id. at 234. Far more securities are traded on securities exchanges and in the
over-the-counter market than are exchanged in face-to-face transactions. A.
BROMBERG, supra note 55, § 8.7(2) at 217. Thus, the Shapiro court's extension of
Affiliated Ute brought large numbers of plaintiffs within the class entitled to use the
Affiliated Ute reliance presumption in private Rule 10b-5 actions.
121 The information involved in Shapiro was that the earnings per share estimate
of the issuer, Douglas Aircraft, was to be revised sharply downward in the company's
annual report, to be issued approximately one month after Merrill Lynch learned of
the revised estimate. 495 F.2d at 231-32. The revised figures showed that Douglas
would earn virtually no profit for the year. Id.
In Id. at 232.
'

i2 Id.

"2'The plaintiffs in Shapiro were individual investors who had purchased Douglas
stock while the earnings information was still secret. They sought to have the action
maintained as a class action. The court denied this motion, holding that it was impossible to determine the parameters of the class. Id. at 233-34.
,z Id. at 233 n.8.
126 Id. at 240. The court stated that "defendants were under a duty ...
not to
trade in, or recommend trading in Douglas stock without publicly disclosing the revised earnings information.. .. They breached that duty. Causation in fact therefore
has been established." Id.
"I See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968); Painter,
Inside Information: Growing Painsfor the Development of Federal CorporationLaw
Under Rule lOb-5, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1361, 1378-85 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Painter].
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defendant's breach of its duty to disclose material inside information
was held dispositive.'1 The court applied the Affiliated Ute rule and
held that the plaintiff could establish the requisite causal link between the violation and the harm alleged by merely demonstrating
the materiality of the undisclosed information.' 9
Shapiro subjected the non-trading, tipper defendant (Merrill
Lynch) and the trading, tippee defendants (Merrill Lynch's customers) to potential liability to anyone who had purchased the stock in
question while the earnings information remained undisclosed.' The
potential damage liability of the defendants was obviously quite
large, a fact expressly recognized by the court.1 3'
The very large potential damage recovery resulting from an application of Shapiro'32 led the Sixth Circuit to apply a somewhat different test in a recent case factually analogous to Shapiro. The case,
Fridrich v. Bradford,'33 involved insiders trading for their own benefit.'34 The defendants'3 5 had advance knowledge of an impending
merger that would enhance the value of the stock involved in the
case.'36 They bought shares of the company, which rose substantially
495 F.2d at 240.
'21
The Shapiro opinion is not clear as to whether the materiality of the undisclosed information supports an inference that the plaintiffs, as reasonab:e investors,
would have relied on it or rather an inference that sufficient numbers of other reasonable investors would have relied so that the integrity of the market price was impaired
by its nondisclosure. Id. Logical consistency dictates the latter view because the plaintiffs demonstrated the damage element of their cause of action by showing the fall in
the market price after the earnings information became public. Id. at 233 n.8. See note
113 supra.
'2

''

495 F.2d at 241.

Id. at 240-41. Recognizing that it had defined a very large class of potential
plaintiffs and that the defendants' total liability might thus be enormous, the Second
Circuit remanded to the district court for determination of the proper measure of
damages.
132See text accompanying note 117 supra.
'- 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3460 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1977)
(No. 76-605).
"' There was no allegation of tipping in Fridrich.Judge Celebrezze saw the presence of tipping in Shapiro and its absence in Fridrichas making it possible to view
the two cases as consistent with each other. See text accompanying notes 158-165 infra.
"I There were technically five defendants before the court; J.C. Bradford, J.C.
Bradford, Jr. and three brokerage-related firms completely controlled by the two individual defendants. 542 F.2d at 309 n.4. The court's analysis of the causation issue,
however, focuses almost entirely on the actions of the two individual defendants. The
Sixth Circuit's discussion of the damages assessed by the lower court deals solely with
the liability of defendant Bradford, Jr. See note 146 infra.
'l' Defendant Bradford, Sr. learned of the upcoming merger in Fridrichbecause
of his status as controlling shareholder in one of the companies involved, Old Line Life
'3'

904

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIV

in value after the news of the upcoming merger became public several
months later.'37 There was no allegation that defendants disclosed the
38
information to any investors beyond their immediate families.'
In the ensuing private damage action, the district court held that
any investor who sold the stock in question during the several months
that the defendants' tortious conduct went undisclosed was entitled
to recover damages from the defendants.'39 Echoing Shapiro, the district court in Fridrichheld that plaintiffs fulfilled the requirement of
Insurance (Old Line). He then informed-defendant Bradford, Jr. of the impending
merger. 542 F.2d at 309-10. In addition, defendant J.C. Bradford & Co., a brokerage
firm controlled by the two individual defendants, was the principal market maker for
the shares of Old Line. A market maker is a broker who offers and obligates himself
to buy and sell a particular security at quoted prices. Id. at 309 n.5. In their various
capacities as controlling shareholder, market marker, and officer of the market maker,
the defendants not only learned of the upcoming merger but participated intimately
in the negotiations that brought it to fruition. Id. at 310-11.
' Defendant Bradford, Sr. learned on April 21, 1972 that the merger was quite
likely to occur and had as of that date an approximate knowledge of the merger terms.
Between April 21 and April 27, Bradford purchased several thousand shares of Old
Line for the account of his wife and that of a firm totally controlled by him. Bradford,
Jr., after being informed of the probability of a merger, purchased 1225 shares of Old
Line on April 27. Two of the plaintiffs purchased their shares of Old Line in May 1972
and sold them in mid-June. The other plaintiff was a long time Old Line shareholder
who likewise chose to sell in mid-June.
A press release announcing the upcoming merger was issued on June 29, 1972.
Bradford, Jr. sold his shares of Old Line on July 31, realizing a profit of $13,000. A
portion of the shares which Bradford, Sr. had caused to be purchased were sold on
August 24 at a profit of $103,000. The remainder of the shares purchased as a result of
Bradford Sr.'s actions were not sold but had appreciated $74,000 in value as of the date
the merger became effective. The facts of the defendant's tortious conduct became
public on November 10, 1972, when the SEC filed an enforcement action against the
five defendants. As a result of that action, the defendants were required to disgorge
their profits, and Bradford, Sr. and Bradford, Jr. were suspended from any brokeragerelated activity for periods of 60 and 20 days, respectively. 542 F.2d at 311-12.
''

Id. at 309-12.

[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,723 (M.D. Tenn.
1974). The district court's holding as to the relevant period of nondisclosure is a
questionable application of Shapiro. The defendants violated Rule 10b-5 by trading
in the shares of Old Line while news of the upcoming merger was undisclosed (a period
of 60 days; April 21 to June 29). Yet the district court held that any investor who sold
Old Line stock during the 148-day period while the defendants' tortious conduct was
undisclosed was entitled to recover. This arguable extension of Shapiro was immaterial
on the facts of Fridrichbecause all of the plaintiffs before the court had sold prior to
the press release announcing the merger. However, the possibility that, under the
district court's reasoning, a plaintiff who had sold Old Line stock while fully cognizant
of the upcoming merger could recover from the defendants in a Rule 10b-5 action
premised on defendants' trading prior to the press release disturbed the Sixth Circuit.
542 F.2d at 321 n.29.
'3
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proving causation by proving that defendants had breached their
duty to disclose material information or refrain from trading in the
stock. '0
The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the lower court had overextended Rule 10b-5.111 The court of appeals conceded that the defendant in Fridrichhad breached Rule 10b-5 by trading on material
inside information, but found that this breach was not causally connected to the plaintiff's harm.12 The court rejected the causation rule
set forth in Affiliated Ute, distinguishing that case on its facts.
Affiliated Ute involved a deliberate scheme to defraud the investorplaintiffs in a face-to-face transaction.' Applying Affiliated Ute to
the facts of Fridrichwould, the court stated, lead to an unjust and
unworkable result.' The court distinguished face-to-face and open
market transactions, stating that the natural limitations on damages
present in the former are absent in the latter.'45 Noting the need to
impose some such limits to avoid what it regarded as an unjust result,' the court adopted a very narrow view of the scope of private
"I.[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 94,723 at 96,404. The
"disclose or refrain from trading" duty for insiders possessing material, nonpublic
information originated in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
The defendants in Fridrichviolated Rule 10b-5 by breaching this duty. However, the
district court held that the defendants breached the duty not only by trading for their
own personal gain, but also by continuing their normal market maker activities. [19741975 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 94,723 at 96,406. See note 136 supra.
"1 542 F.2d at 309.
112Id. at 318-19.

,,Id. See 406 U.S. at 145-48.
" 542 F.2d at 319-20.
,,Id. at 321. The court noted that a strong policy consideration favoring some
limits on open market Rule 10b-5 damages was that such judgments would often
ultimately be paid by innocent stockholders for the benefit of speculators. Id. at n.28,
citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, C.J.,
concurring).
"I The court illustrated the potential damage recovery under the district court's
test in Fridrichby reference to the liability of defendant Bradford, Jr. He had made a
profit of $13,000 from his inside dealings. See note 137 supra. The district court had
found him liable for $361,000 in damages. The Sixth Circuit stated that if all persons
who had sold their shares in the company during the three days when plaintiffs sold
their shares were joined in a class action, Bradford, Jr.'s liability under the district
court's test would have been approximately $800,000. If the period were extended to
the date of publication of the news of the upcoming merger, Bradford, Jr.'s potential
liability was $3,700,000. If the period were extended to the length the district court
thought proper, until the disclosure of defendant's tortious activities, see note 139
supra, Bradford, Jr.'s liability in a class action would have totaled more than
$7,000,000. 542 F.2d at 321 n.29.
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Rule 10b-5 actions.' Under Fridrich,private damage liability must
be based on a showing of "causation." However, the Sixth Circuit did
not discuss how causation could be shown in an open market case. 4 8
On the facts before it, the Fridrich court held that the defendant's
act of trading with third persons was not causally related to the
plaintiff's harm.' The court's analysis in support of its holding is not
particularly clear. Apparently the major factors considered in
Fridrich were the "undisputed" fact that the defendants had not
purchased any shares from the plaintiffs and that "defendant's act
of trading in no way influenced plaintiffs' decision to sell.' ' 0
The Fridrich court's analysis seems questionable for several reasons. First, the court's holding is limited to a conclusory statement
that the plaintiffs failed to establish causation,' but no techniques
for analyzing future causation questions are provided. Further, the
court's comments in attempting to justify its holding, focusing on the
lack of contact between the plaintiffs and defendants and on the fact
that defendants' trading was with third persons and not with the
plaintiffs, evince an inaccurate view of the nature of the causal chain
involved in open market Rule 10b-5 cases." 2 The factors discussed by
the Fridrich court would have been appropriate in the analysis of
reliance in a face-to-face transaction prior to Affiliated Ute.8 3 However, these factors are inappropriate in a case involving anonymous
open market transactions. In such transactions no single investor
"trades" with any other investor in the sense that the Sixth Circuit
used the term in Fridrich.Rather, all investors trade with reference
to the market. Causation for Rule 10b-5 purposes stems from viola"' Illustrative of the narrow view which the Fridrichappeals court took of private
Rule 10b-5 actions is the fact that the court "seriously considered" basing its holding
on the standing issue raised by the purchaser-seller requirement. 542 F.2d at 315 n.21,
citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See Part A supra.
The court saw the possibility of a decision based on Blue Chip by virtue of the fact
that "none of the plaintiff's sold to the defendants, directly or indirectly." 542 F.2d at
315 n.21. The implications of such a doctrine are clear. If plaintiffs were required to
establish that they had purchased or sold stock from or to a particular defendant,
private Rule 10b-5 actions would be largely eliminated in open market cases by the
insurmountable problems of proof which plaintiffs would face in meeting the
purchaser-seller requirement.
" 542 F.2d at 318-19.

"'

Id.
Id. at 318.

151
Id. at 318-19.
152See

note 113 supra.
1wSee text accompanying notes 99-104 supra.
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tions which impair the integrity of the market.'54 By failing to recognize the "fraud on the market" variety of causation and looking instead to factors appropriate in the analysis of face-to-face transactions, Fridrichimposes undesirable limits on the reach of Rule 10b-5
actions in open market cases. 55
Nonetheless, the general objective sought by the Fridrichcourt of
limiting the class protected by Rule 10b-5 as a means of curbing the
expansion of liability under the Rule is consistent with recent trends
in the Rule 10b-5 area.' Judge Celebrezze's concurring opinion in
Fridrichposed a possible reconciliation of Fridrichand Shapirowhich
treated the causation question more satisfactorily than did the majority opinion. Judge Celebrezze focused on the policy of the securities
acts that all investors trading in an open market should possess equal
information.'57 The objection to trading on inside information is that
it creates an information imbalance, giving an improper advantage
to the investor who possesses the information.'58 However, Judge Celebrezze stated that after the insider ceases his trading, the information imbalance equalizes, because no longer does any investor trading
in the market possess superior information.'59 Applying this rationale
to open market Rule 10b-5 cases, Judge Celebrezze reasoned that
only those investors victimized by an information imbalance, that is,
" One commentator has stated the basis for the "fraud on the market" approach
to causation as follows, "the market should not produce windfalls for some at the
expense of others through control of information." 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 55, §
8.7(2) at 217-18. See note 113 supra.
I" The possible effect of Fridrichis to deny Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs in open market
cases the presumption of causation from a showing of materiality laid down by
Affiliated Ute. But cf. 542 F.2d at 323-27 (concurring opinion of Judge Celebrezze)
(limits class of open market plaintiffs entitled to Affiliated Ute presumption in a case
such as Fridrich where no "tipping" occurred to those investors who traded while
integrity of market was impaired, plaintiffs in Fridrichstated not to fall within this
class). The effect of such a doctrine would be to require plaintiffs to demonstrate
causation. The Fridrichmajority goes on to imply that plaintiffs must demonstrate
that they traded with a particular defendant in order to demonstrate causation. 542
F.2d at 318-19. In an anonymous market, such a showing is virtually impossible. The
effect is to eliminate Rule lob-5 private actions in open market trading cases. Such a
result is undesirable given the fact that the great bulk of securities transactions occur
in open markets. See A. BROMBERO, supra note 55, § 8.7(2) at 217.
I' See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps
v, Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
" 542 F.2d at 324-25 (Celebrezze, J., concurring). Judge Celebrezze's emphasis
on the policy of equal information for all investors is identical to the focus of the

Shapiro court. See text accompanying note 127 supra.
' 542 F.2d at 326-27.
' 542 F.2d at 326-27.

See notes 113 & 154 supra.
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those who traded contemporaneously with an insider should be allowed to recover under Rule 10b-5.110 Comparing Shapiro and
Fridrich,Judge Celebrezze concluded that the holding in Shapirohad
been dictated by the fact that Merrill Lynch's "tipping" of its customers"" had served to perpetuate the information imbalance caused
by the initial failure to disclose for as long as the information remained secret.' Fridrichon the other hand had not involved tipping,
and thus by the time plaintiffs sold their shares the information
imbalance in the market had equalized.6 3 Thus, where no information imbalance existed, no purpose was served by extending the
Affiliated Ute presumption of causation from material nondisclosure.
Judge Celebrezze's "information imbalance" analysis of the protected class of plaintiffs entitled to the benefit of the Affiliated Ute
reliance presumption is a rational attempt to limit the reach of Rule
10b-5 in open market, insider trading cases while adhering to the
policy of equality of information for all investors and the "fraud on
the market" approach to causation in open market cases. However,
his opinion appears deficient in certain respects. While the focus on
the information imbalance caused by insider trading is analytically
sound'64 and the notion that such imbalance dissipates after insider
market activity ceases likewise seems unassailable, Judge Celebrezze
does not define "contemporaneous" trading for the purpose of determining the protected class.6 5 Similarly, the concurring opinion fails
to discuss how long the market effect of insider trading endures and
thus how long investors are victimized by the information imbalance- 6 ' a crucial determination for practical application of the test
proposed by Judge Celebrezze.
Fridrichrepresents an effort to limit the massive damage liability
made possible by the extension of Affiliated Ute to open market
situations. Such an effort is consistent with recent trends in Rule 10b5 decisions.6 7 However, the Fridrich court fails to provide a satisfactory analytical basis for its holding limiting the reach of Rule 10b-5
I However, Judge Celebrezze's concurrence in Fridrich provides inadequate
guidelines for application. See text accompanying notes 164-166 infra.
"I See text accompanying note 118 supra.
112542 F.2d at 327.
163 Id.

See text accompanying note 154 supra.
542 F.2d at 326-27.
1' Id.
"6 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 97 S.Ct. 1292 (1977); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723 (1975).
"'
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and arguably adopts a view of the causation element inappropriate
to open market transactions. Judge Celebrezze's concurring opinion,
however, analyzes the facts of Fridrich and justifies the result in
terms consistent with the accepted view of causation in open market
Rule 10b-5 cases. Unfortunately, his theory lacks adequate guidelines
for application of the proposed "information imbalance" test.
C.

Culpability Required for Rule 10b-5 Liability

The degree of culpability necessary to support liability under Rule
10b-5 was long the subject of much dispute.' 8 The Supreme Court's
.1976 decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder'6' authoritatively resolved some but not all of the questions in this area.7 0 Ernst & Ernst
involved an allegation that an accounting firm had breached Rule
10b-5 by negligently conducting an audit in failing to discover and
disclose an intra-office "mail rule"'' used by the subject company's
president to carry out a scheme to defraud investors." 2 The Supreme
Court reversed a lower court decision for the plaintiffs and stated that
an allegation of mere negligence does not state a claim under Rule
10b-5.73 After analyzing the statutory language'74 and legislative hisEU Compare Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425
U.S. 185 (1976) (negligence standard) with Sargent v. Genesco, Inc. 492 F.2d 750, 761
(5th Cir. 1974) (recklessness standard) and White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir.
1974), noted at 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 99 (1975) (flexible duty standard, degree of
culpability required held dependent on facts and circumstances). No cases would
accept only the highest degree of culpability, that of conscious intent to defraud, in
order to impose Rule 10b-5 liability. See Campbell, Elements of Recovery Under Rule
lOb-5: Scienter, Reliance, and Plaintiff's Reasonable Conduct Requirement, 26 S.C.L.
REV. 653, 656 n.12 (1975). See generally Bucklo, Scienter and Rule lOb-5, 67 Nw.
U. L. REv. 562, 598-600 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Bucklo, Scienter]; 1975-1976 Developments note 5 supra, at 937-44.
"' 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
110See text accompanying notes 178-179 infra.
272 The "mail rule" involved in Ernst & Ernst provided that mail addressed to the
president of First Securities Company, the brokerage firm which was the subject of
defendant's audit, was not to be opened even if it arrived in his absence. This mail
rule enabled the president to keep secret a scheme whereby he induced customers to
invest in spurious "escrow" accounts with promises of high rates of return and then
converted their funds immediately upon receipt. See 25 EMORY L.J. 465, 465-66 (1976).
172425 U.S. 188-90 (1976).
273 Id. at 193. The Court also rejected as improperly raised a claim by plaintiffs
that Ernst & Ernst had breached § 17(a) of the '34 Act, 15'U.S.C. § 78p (1970), and
SEC Rule 17(a)-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1976). 425 U.S. at 194 n.13.
"7 The Court reasoned that the use of the words "manipulative," "device," and
"contrivance" in § 10(b) indicated an unmistakeable intent to proscribe a type of
conduct quite different from negligence. Rather, in the Court's opinion, the plain
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tory75 of the securities acts, the Court held that liability under Rule
10b-5 requires an allegation of intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud, which was denoted as "scienter."' 76
Ernst & Ernst ended the debate over whether Rule 10b-5 reached
negligent misrepresentations in private damage actions.,7 However,
the opinion did not treat the question of whether scienter would be
required in SEC enforcement actions."8 Further, while the Court
meaning of the words in § 10(b) "connote intentional or willful conduct designed to
defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities." 425
U.S. at 199. Once the Court adopted this view of the language of § 10(b), the conclusion
that the SEC lacks the power to promulgate a rule which requires a lesser degree of
culpability than the statute is inevitable. The Court thus reasoned that Rule lOb-5
could not be extended to encompass negligent conduct. 425 U.S. at 213-14. See
generally, Loss, Summary Remarks, 30 Bus. LAW. 163, 165 (Special Issue March 1975).
The Court bolstered its "plain meaning" construction of the language of § 10(b)
with an argument founded upon the statutory scheme set out in the securities laws,
emphasizing the interrelated nature of the provisions of those laws. Reasoning that
every provision in the securities laws which allowed private recovery for negligent
conduct also imposed significant procedural restrictions, the Court concluded that to
allow recovery for negligence under § 10(b), which did not contain such procedural
safeguards, would violate congressional intent. 425 U.S. at 208-10.
"I Although admitting that the legislative history of § 10(b) was "bereft" of any
specific mention of the statute's intended reach, the Court focused on the statement
of one draftsman of the Act that § 10(b) was a "catch-all" designed to enable the SEC
to deal with "new manipulative devices." 425 U.S. at 202-03, quoting Hearingson H.R.
7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (statement of Thomas G. Corcoran). The Court concluded that no lawyer, legislative draftsman or legislator would use such words "if the
intent was to create liability for merely negligent acts or omissions." 425 U.S. at 203.
"1,
425 U.S. at 214. The substantive content of the term "scienter" has been the
subject of much confusion and debate. See, e.g., Bucklo, Scienter, supra note 168;
Mann, Rule lOb-5: Evolution of a Continuumof Conduct to Replace the Catch-Phrases
of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rsv. 1206 (1970). Despite the volume and
vehemence of this debate only one substantive benchmark can be ascertained as to the
practical effect of the statement that Rule lob-5 liability must now be predicated on
a showing of "scienter", namely that proof of negligence is insufficient. Beyond that,
the term scienter is largely devoid of substantive content except for the truism that
scienter is that degree of culpability which will support Rule lOb-5 liability. After Ernst
& Ernst the issue with regard to culpability revolves around what sorts of conduct can
be encompassed within the rubric of "scienter". For a discussion of the semantic
difficulties surrounding the term scienter, both before and after Ernst & Ernst, see
Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule 10b-5; Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REv. 213 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bucklo, Ernst
& Ernst]; Floor, The Scienter Requirement Under Rule 10b-5 and Reliance on Advice
of Counsel After Hochfelder, 12 NEw ENGL. L. REv. 191 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Floor].
7

See note 168 supra.

"I See text accompanying notes 180-211 infra.
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ruled out negligence as a basis for Rule 10b-5 liability, it expressly
refrained from deciding whether a misrepresentation made with reckless disregard for the truth but without conscious intent to defraud
would give rise to Rule 10b-5 liability.' 9 Courts dealing with Rule
10b-5 cases during the past year have faced these questions in attempting to apply Ernst & Ernst.
SEC Enforcement Actions
Unlike private damage actions, SEC enforcement actions are
brought to protect the investing public from violations of the securities laws rather than to compensate individual investors harmed by
,"1 425 U.S. at 194 n.12. The Court stated, "[in certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability
for some act. We need not address here the question of whether, in some circumstances,
reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." Id. See
text accompanying notes 212-234 infra.
An additional question left unresolved by the Ernst & Ernst Court was the impact
of its holding on the standard of culpability required for secondary defendants in
private Rule 10b-5 actions. The class of secondary defendants consists primarily of
parties involved in securities transactions in a professional, advisory capacity. See,
e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (accountant); SEC v. Spectrum,
Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973) (attorney); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) (broker); Crofoot v. Sperry Rand Corp", [19761977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,611 (E.D. Cal. March 3, 1976)
(data processing company); Fisher v. New York Stock Exchange, 408 F. Supp. 745
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (stock exchange). See generally Ruder, Multiple DefendantsIn Securities Law Fraud Causes: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto,
Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Ruder]. Secondary defendants in Rule 10b-5 actions can be held liable as aiders
and abettors of those violations if they have knowledge of the violation and render
substantial assistance to the primary wrongdoer. See Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522
F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973). Prior to Ernst &
Ernst there was substantial debate as to whether this test should be applied so as to
hold parties professionally involved in securities transactions to a negligence standard
of culpability under Rule 10b-5. See, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir.
1973); Lowenfels, ExpandingPublic Responsibilitiesof SecuritiesLawyers, An Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Prioritiesof Duties, 74 COLUM. L. REv.
412 (1974).
However, the Supreme Court's clear statement in Ernst & Ernst that a showing
of scienter is required for private Rule 10b-5 liability is not limited to primary defendants. Thus, the effect of Ernst & Ernst is to lessen the distinction between primary
defendants and their professional advisors by imposing the same standard of culpability for all varieties of Rule 10b-5 violations. See generally Note, Rule 10b-5; Liability
For Aiding and Abetting After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 28 U. FLA. L. Rev. 999
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Aiding and Abetting]; 1975-1976 Developments supra
note 5, at 944-50.
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such violations.'80 Considering this variance in purpose, differing
culpability standards may be appropriate in these two types of actions.'"' The consequences of an SEC injunction can be quite serious,
however, particularly when the defendant is a professional, including
disbarment from practice before the SEC or suspension from securities-related activities."s2 This gravity of potential consequences militates against a lower standard of culpability in enforcement actions
than the scienter standard imposed in private damage actions
by Ernst & Ernst. Further, the statutory language cited in Ernst &
Ernst as dictating that negligence be eliminated as a basis for Rule
10b-5 liability' 3 was written only with SEC actions in mind, well
before a private right of action under Rule 10b-5 was judicially implied.'84 A division of authority developed in the last year as to which
of these arguments was more persuasive and therefore as to what
standard of culpability is proper in SEC enforcement actions following Ernst & Ernst.'
'0 See, e.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F,2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975);
SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972); Painter, supra
note 127.
"' Advocates of applying a lower standard of culpability in SEC enforcement
actions than that applicable in private damage actions argue that the public need for
protection against violations of Rule lOb-5 is the same regardless of the defendant's
state of mind. Thus, the contention is that the SEC should be allowed to continue to
seek injunctions against negligent violations of the Rule even after Ernst & Ernst. See,
e.g., SEC General Counsel's Memorandum Regarding Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA), No. 354 at F-1 - F-2 (May 26, 1976); Floor, supra note
176, at 208-13.
"I Rule 2(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice provides for disbarment from practice
before the Commission of any attorney, accountant, engineer or other professional
expert against whom an injunction has been entered. Such disbarment is at the Commission's discretion and requires no hearing. Other sanctions available to the SEC
include the power to order enjoined defendants not to engage in securities-related
activities for a given period of time. See, e.g., Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th
Cir. 1976) (sixty- and twenty-day suspensions from association with a broker, dealer
or investment advisor to two defendants); In re Seidman & Seidman, SEC Rel. No.
34-12,752 [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
72,218 (Sept. 1,
1976) (accounting firm ordered not to undertake any new audit contracts with publiclyheld companies).
' 425 U.S. at 199-201.
'' The legislative and administrative history of § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 contain
no indication that Congress or the SEC contemplated a private right of action under
either of these enactments. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6 (1934); SEC
Rel. No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). A private right of action under Rule 10b-5 was judicially
implied in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947), and has
never been seriously questioned. See note 99 supra.
"I See text accompanying notes 191-207 infra.
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In SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,'"8 the court held that Ernst &
Ernst applied with equal force to both private damage actions and
SEC enforcement actions and that a showing of scienter was consequently required for liability in an enforcement action.'87 The case
involved an allegation by the SEC that the chairman of the board of
defendant Bausch & Lomb had leaked confidential earnings estimates to securities analysts.'1 The facts surrounding the disclosure
left little doubt that the leak -was not part of any fraudulent
scheme.'89
The court consequently found no violation of Rule 10b-5 and denied the SEC injunctive relief. ' Although the opinion expressly recognized that Ernst & Ernst was factually distinguishable from an
SEC enforcement action,'' the court found that the language of the
securities acts and the thrust of Ernst & Ernst dictated that scienter
be pleaded and proved regardless of whether the suit is brought.by
the SEC or a private litigant.'92 The court noted that policy consider' 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Accord, SEC v. American Realty Trust,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,913, at 91,439-40 (E.D. Va.
Feb. 24, 1977).
" 420 F. Supp. at 1240-44.
' The SEC alleged that a number of interviews hnd phone conversations were
involved in the disclosures in Bausch & Lomb. 420 F. Supp. at 1237-38. See note 189
infra.
" The actions of Bausch & Lomb's chairman belie any fraudulent intent. The
company had been in a slight earnings slump but expected an upturn because of new
product introductions and improvements in existing products. During the course of an
ordinary interview with a financial analyst the chairman provided no more than "links
in a chain of analytical information." Id. at 1237, quoting, In re Investors Management
Co., SEC Rel. No. 9267 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
78,163, at 80,519 (1971).
The analyst reduced his earnings estimate as a result of the interview and cancelled "buy" recommendations on Bausch & Lomb stock. Attempting to correct what
he regarded as an inaccurate estimate and to prevent the estimate from gaining wide
credence, the board chairman telephoned the analyst and gave him an estimate based
on internal, company calculations. He then immediately released the information to
the financial press and to those callers who got through to him despite the
"inundation" of Bausch & Lomb's switchboard. 420 F. Supp. at 1237-38.
"10 Issuance of an injunction under the securities laws requires a reasonable likelihood that defendants will violate the securities laws in the future. See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 881, 887 (2d Cir. 1975). The Bausch & Lomb court
stated that even if the requisite degree of culpability had been shown, the improbability of continuing violations would have justified denial of the SEC's prayer for injunctive relief. 420 F. Supp. at 1244-46.
Id. at 1240, citing Ernst & Ernst at 194 n.12.
,32420 F. Supp. at 1240-41.
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ations could be used to distinguish the two types of actions" 3 but
decided that if the language and history of section 10(b) were dispositive with regard to private litigants whose right of action was judicially created, the same was true of the SEC, whose actions were
"creatures of the statute."' 94 Given the results of its statutory construction, the court declined to examine policy considerations.,"
The First Circuit focused on these policy considerations-the differing purposes served by SEC enforcement actions and private damage actions-and reached a contrary result in SEC v. World Radio
Mission, Inc. "I In World Radio the SEC sought an injunction against
a religious organization 9 ' for violations of both Rule 10b-5 and section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.111 The defendant argued that no
Id. at 1241, citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir.
1968) (Friendly, C.J., concurring). See note 181 supra.
,' 420 F. Supp. at 1241.
"g Id., quoting Ernst & Ernst at 214 n.33. But cf. SEC v. Universal Major Indus.
Corp., 11976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,804 (2d Cir. Dec.
16, 1976) (policy considerations justify rejection of an argument based on Ernst &
Ernst; allegation of negligence sufficient to support SEC enforcement acton under § 5
of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970)). Universal involved an attorney charged with
aiding and abetting a violation of § 5 of the '33 Act by issuing opinion letters which
made possible the transfer of securities which were issued in violation of the registration requirements of the '33 Act. The court rejected defendant's contention that an
allegation of scienter was required to state a cause of action for an SEC injunction
under § 5 after Ernst & Ernst. The Universal court noted, however, that § 5 of the '33
Act expressly forbids the sale of unregistered stock directly or indirectly. The court's
holding that an SEC action for an injunction against negligent violations of such a
specific statutory provision would lie after Ernst & Ernst does not dispose of the
question of the requisite degree of culpability in an SEC enforcement action under
Rule 10b-5. But the court's extensive discussion of the differing purposes of SEC
enforcement actions and private damage actions indicates a willingness to distinguish
the two with regard to the requisite standard of culpability. Further, the court reasoned
that if a showing of scienter were required, proof that the defendant acted with reckless
disregard for the truth would constitute such a showing. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,804 at 90,916, citing Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d
Cir. 1973). The court did not address the question of the continued validity of imposing
Rule 10b-5 liability for recklessness after Ernst & Ernst. See text accompanying notes

212-234 infra.
' 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976).

,gThe defendant in World Radio raised funds through the sale of bonds which it
characterized as "Christian Loan Plans." The organization urged investors to commit
their funds to "God's economy" and represented its financial structure as "capable of
paying investors and still produce ton upon ton of free Gospel literature." Id. at 53940. In fact, the organization was able to avoid default only by borrowing funds fast
enough to meet matured obligations, and treating these newly borrowed funds as
"revenue." Id.
11915 U.S.C. § 77q(a). Section 17(a) provides:
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injunction could issue because the SEC had failed to demonstrate
scienter as required by Ernst & Ernst."I The court rejected this argument, holding that scienter was irrelevant in a SEC enforcement
action. ' Although the First Circuit declined to place full reliance for
0 ' the court clearly stated that
its holding on its view of Ernst & Ernst,"
a scienter standard of culpability was inappropriate in SEC enforcement actions.2 2 The World Radio court placed primary emphasis on
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or
indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement
of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
[Do544 F.2d at 540.
2
oId.
"I The court declared that it was "implausible to suppose that Congress intended
to provide a mechanism for the SEC to protect the public from the injurious schemes
of those of evil intent and yet leave the public prey to the same conduct perpetrated
by the careless or reckless." 544 F.2d at 541 n.10. However, the court went on to state
that it need not reach this question to uphold the injunction sought in World Radio
because § 17(a) clearly authorizes the issuance of an injunction without regard to the
defendant's state of mind. See note 198 supra. The court rejected defendant's argument that, because the language of § 17(a) was virtually identical to that of Rule 10b5 and because Ernst & Ernst held that scienter was thus required for liability under
the latter, scienter was thus required for § 17(a) liability as well. Reading Ernst &
Ernst carefully, the court reasoned correctly that the Supreme Court had not held in
Ernst & Ernst that the language of Rule 10b-5 dictated scienter as the applicable
standard of culpability. See note 174 supra. Rather, the Ernst & Ernst decision held
that, given the statutory language of § 10(b) of the '34 Act, it was beyond the rulemaking power of the SEC to promulgate a rule allowing liability for less than scienter.
Section 17(a), as a congressional enactment, was not subject to this limitation and thus
could be interpreted as allowing an SEC injunction against merely negligent violations
of its terms. 544 F.2d at 541 n.10.
m 544 F.2d at 540. The World Radio court went on to state that an injunction
would be appropriate even if a showing of scienter were required because "an injunction is issued only after an adjudication that defendant's proposed conduct prima facie
violates the statute" and that "their demonstrated intent to continue evidences, at the
least, an intent to do what they now know a federal court, as well as the SEC, has found
deceptive." Id. at 541. One commentator has cited this language with approval and
concluded that "the suit itself will place the defendant on notice with respect to the
misleading nature of similar future conduct." 90 HARv. L. REv. 1018, 1025 (1977). This
analysis is flawed, however, and underestimates the significance of Ernst & Ernst in
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the differing purposes served by private actions and enforcement actions.213 Because an injunction is "designed to protect the public
against conduct, not to punish a state of mind ' 2 4 the World Radio
court viewed the defendant's alleged good faith as irrelevant. 25 World
Radio failed to deal with the argument held determinative in Bausch
& Lomb 25 that the Ernst & Ernst Court found the statutory language
SEC injunction actions. Granting for purposes of argument as did the World Radio
court, that a showing of scienter by the SEC is a prerequisite to the issuance of an
injunction, that showing cannot be made simply by demonstrating that the defendant
intends to continue his present conduct. A further showing that he intends to do so
with the requisite state of mind is required. To supply this state of mind by reasoning
that defendant has been shown likely to continue with conduct which has been
"adjudged deceptive" is not logically consistent. The deceptiveness of the conduct is
only established when the court determines that it is deceptive, thus only then does
the defendant have the knowledge that provides the requisite state of mind for a Rule
10b-5 violation. His intention to continue with the conduct prior to acquiring this
knowledge cannot constitute a Rule 10b-5 violation because he intended to continue
conduct which he did not yet know or may not believe to be deceptive.
The World Radio court's position, stated accurately, amounts to holding the defendant liable because he has been shown likely to continue with conduct which will
be adjudged deceptive some time after this intention was formed. The state of mind
necessary to sustain Rule 10b-5 liability is supplied retroactively to the defendant's
intention to continue his conduct. Such a result is not supportable after Ernst & Ernst.
A defendant's demonstrable intent to continue his conduct after the commencement
of an SEC injunctive action may well demonstrate only that he disagrees with the
SEC's evaluation of the deceptiveness of his conduct. After Ernst & Ernst if the SEC
is required to demonstrate scienter, it cannot do so simply by showing the defendant
is likely to continue his conduct and that the conduct is deceptive. Rather it must show
that the intention to continue the conduct was formed with the knowledge that the
conduct was deceptive. Thus the defendant's good faith in his prior actions should,
after Ernst & Ernst, bar an SEC injunction by preventing the Commission from establishing scienter.
See text accompanying notes 180-181 supra.
"

544 F.2d at 541.

Id. The World Radio court reasoned that courts which had required a showing
of scienter for private liability under Rule 10b-5 prior to Ernst & Ernst had distinguished SEC enforcement actions and had not considered the defendant's state of
mind relevant to determining liability in those actions, citing, SEC v. Shapiro, 494
F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1974).
20 See text accompanying notes 186-195 supra. One commentator has stated that
a distinction should be drawn between cases where the SEC seeks to enjoin ongoing
conduct found likely to continue and cases where the Commission is seeking what
amounts to a disciplinary injunction based on past conduct. In the former type of
cases, negligence would be the standard of culpability because of the preeminent need
to protect the public from injurious schemes, regardless of the perpetrator's state of
mind. In the latter variety of cases, however, the need for public protection is less
compelling because the conduct has ended and is not likely to recur. Thus, the higher
scienter standard would be more appropriate. See Bauman, supra note 5, at 345.
20
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to be controlling and that the same
statutory language supports both
20 7
varieties of Rule 10b-5 actions.
The fundamental question is whether Ernst & Ernst permits lower
courts to go beyond the statutory language and examine the arguments found persuasive by the World Radio court.2 11 The answer is
not clear. The recent trend in Supreme Court decisions in the securities area emphasizes careful examination of the statutory scheme and
language, and has tended to restrict the expansion of the scope of
Applying this reasoning to the contrasting results in Bausch & Lomb and World
Radio, the two cases apparently can be reconciled on the basis of the likelihood of
recurrence of the violations involved. The violations alleged in Bausch & Lomb were
one time occurrences rather than a pattern of violations amounting to an ongoing
scheme. While the SEC sought to enjoin future violations, the court properly re~cognized that the Commission was really seeking to punish past violations and based its
holding on the lack of scienter. The court stated, alternatively, that if the action were
treated as one to enjoin future violations, the unlikelihood of continuing violations
would have justified the denial of an injunction. 420 F. Supp. at 1244-46.
In contrast, World Radio clearly involved a pattern of violations injurious to the
public and likely to continue unless enjoined. Under those circumstances, the result
in World Radio can be supported as upholding the strong public policy of investor
protection.
This reconciliation of'Bausch & Lomb and World Radio based on the facts of those
two cases does not, however, meet the contention of the Bausch & Lomb court that
Ernst & Ernst bars any consideration of policy questions in assessing the culpability
required for Rule 10b-5 liability. See text accompanying note 211 infra. Further, this
reconciliation rests on a questionable view of the permissible scope of the SEC's enforcement authority under the securities acts, § 20(b) of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b)
(1970), and § 21(e) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970). While the Commission's
power to obtain ancillary forms of relief has recently extended beyond the precise
language of these statutory provisions, whether this authority extends to the use of civil
enforcement powers in circumstances amounting to punishment of past violations is
doubtful. See Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARV.
L. REv. 1779, 1807-14 (1976); Treadway, SEC Enforcement Techniques: Expanding
and Exotic Forms of Ancillary Relief, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 637, 676-79 (1975).
2 See 425 U.S. at 214 n.33. One commentator has stated that by failing to consider policy arguments regarding the reach of Rule 10b-5, the Ernst & Ernst analysis
was inconsistent with the analysis employed in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), which relied heavily on policy arguments in support of the
purchaser-seller requirement. See Aiding-and Abetting, supra note 179, at 1004-05.
This argument seems misconceived. Given the differing issues involved in Ernst &
Ernst and Blue Chip, the Supreme Court's conclusion that the statutory language was
dispositive in one case and not in the other should not be criticized solely on the basis
of "inconsistent" modes of analysis. The conclusion that the language of § 10(b) is
dispositive as to the appropriate standard of culpability in Rule 10b-5 cases and that
policy arguments thus need not be considered is fully consistent with the conclusion
of the Blue Chip Court. There the Court determined that the language of § 10(b) does
not dispose of the question of whether a purchaser-seller requirement is appropriate
and that the Court must thus look further to policy considerations.
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private damage actions under Rule 10b-5.119 However, the Court has
in the past taken a different view of SEC actions. 10
The Bausch & Lomb result, however, emphasizing the language
of section 10(b), appears more consistent with the views of the present
Court as expressed in Ernst & Ernst than does World Radio. If the
Bausch & Lomb court correctly read Ernst & Ernst as barring any
consideration of policy questions in assessing the culpability required
for Rule 10b-5 liability, then the policy objectives sought by the First
Circuit in World Radio can be achieved only by congressional action
amending section 10(b) to allow the SEC to seek injunctions of ongoing, negligent violations. Absent such congressional action or Supreme Court direction to the contrary, courts should require a showing of scienter in SEC enforcement actions as well as private damage
211
actions.
Recklessness
While eliminating Rule 10b-5 liability for mere negligent conduct,
Ernst & Ernst failed to resolve the question of the applicability of
Rule 10b-5 to conduct falling between negligence and conscious intent to defraud-conduct commonly denoted as recklessness.2 12 At
common law, an action for fraud or deceit would lie if the plaintiff
alleged that he had relied to his detriment upon a representation
made with willful or reckless disregard for the truth.2 1 3 Prior to Ernst
& Ernst, courts analogized private actions under Rule 10b-5 to these
2

See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Corp., 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.

Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837
(1975); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); See generally
Note, Judicial Retrenchment Under Rule lOb-5: An End to the Rule as Law?, 1976
DuKE L.J. 789.
210See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963)
(securities laws must be interpreted broadly and flexibly to effectuate their remedial
aims). But cf. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971)
(similarly broad view of private actions held by Supreme Court pre-Ernst & Ernst).
2" See Berner & Franklin, Scienter and Securities and Exchange Commission
Rule lOb-5 Injunctive Actions: A Reappraisalin Light of Hochfelder, 51 N.Y.U.L. Rv.
769 (1976). Contra, Floor, supra, note 176, at 208-13.
2

See A. BROMBERG, supra note 55, § 8.4 at 572.

The seminal case defining the degree of culpability required to give rise to a
common law fraud action is Derry v. Peek, [18891 14 A.C. 337, 374, where the court
held that to prove fraud the plaintiff must show that a false representation had been
made "(1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless
whether it be true or false." See generally Haimoff, Holmes Looks at Hochfelder and
lOb-5, 32 Bus. LAW. 147 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Haimoff].
212
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common law actions"4 and allowed recovery where the defendant
acted recklessly."' However, the Ernst & Ernst Court's emphasis on
the need to show an intentional act to justify imposition of liability
under Rule 10b-5 and its express refusal to decide the recklessness
2 17
issue21 1 challenged the continued validity of this doctrine.

Two cases that have dealt with this question during the past year
have concluded that Ernst & Ernst does not preclude Rule 10b-5
liability for recklessness. The Second Circuit in Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath2 8 held that an accounting firm
which exhibited reckless disregard for the truth in conducting an
audit had demonstrated a sufficient degree of scienter to warrant
Rule 10b-5 liability.t9 The firm's audit report disregarded fundamental accounting principles and gave immediate recognition as sales
and profits to very contingent transactions which represented the
largest undertakings in the history of the subject of the audit.220 The
-court distinguished Ernst & Ernst on the ground that plaintiffs there
had proceeded solely on a theory of negligence and that the Supreme
Court's holding addressed only that question. 2 ' Defendants in
Herzfeld were liable, the court stated, not for negligence in failing to
discover some hidden fact as had been the case in Ernst & Ernst, but
rather because of their active participation in the preparation of materially misleading financial reports upon which the plaintiff relied
222
to his detriment.

See text accompanying notes 99-104 supra.
e.g., SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
908 (1975); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973); Cohen v. Franchard
Corp., 478 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).,
211 425 U.S. at 194 n.11.
217 See test accompanying notes 232-234 infra.
211

2,5See,

220
22

540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976).
Id. at 37.

12 The transactions involved were the purchase of nursing homes for approximately $13 million and their sale for approximately $15 million. All that had occurred
prior to the closing day of the audit period however, was the payment of $5,000 toward
the purchase of the nursing homes. No steps past an agreement in principle had been
taken toward their sale. Further, substantial doubt existed as to whether the proposed
purchaser had sufficient resources to go through with the purchase. The audit report
disclosed none of these facts, but rather listed the proceeds of the sale as "deferred
gross profit." In addition, the auditor "generated" journal entries and corporate minutes authorizing the transactions. The effect of the transactions on the financial picture presented was dramatic. Without the immediate recognition of the nursing home
sales as profit the subject of the audit had a net income loss of $169,000 and earnings
pre share of -$0.25. Defendants' accounting treatment caused the firm's statement to
reflect net income of $66,000 and earnings per share of $1.10. Id. at 29-31.

"' Id. at 37.
n/d.
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A similar result was reached in another reckless audit case,
McClean v. Alexander."3 Exhibiting a lack of care similar to that
involved in Herzfeld, the defendant in McClean accepted without
investigation the audit subject's characterization of certain transactions as "sales" which were in fact consignments. 24 The audit report
listed revenues from these spurious sales as receivables considered
"fully collectible. ' 25 This accounting treatment resulted in the company showing a positive net income rather than a loss for the period
of the audit.2 2 1 Plaintiff, an individual investor who had relied on the
audit report in making a decision to purchase the company, sued the
2
auditor under Rule 10b-5. 2
As in Herzfeld, the court distinguished Ernst & Ernst as holding
only that negligence was an insufficient basis for Rule 10b-5 liability.21 The defendant's conduct in McClean was far more than negligent, although it fell short of an actual preconceived intent to defraud. 229 Given its view of Ernst & Ernst as non-determinative, the
McClean court looked to common law25 and pre-Ernst & Ernst cases
involving reckless conduct and held that a sufficient showing of scienter to support liability had been made.2 1
420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976).
The audit in McClean was conducted under inherently suspicious circumstances. The company was in desperate need of funds. The auditor knew this and knew
that the audit report had to be done quickly and reflect a favorable outlook if the
company was to remain solvent. The company manufactured and sold laser tools. The
financial difficulties were largely the result of the low marketability of these tools and
high incidence of product failure. Nonetheless, the auditor accepted the word of company salesmen that transactions which were in fact consignments were sales. The
auditor made only minimal attempts to confirm these "sales" and received no reply
from companies whose alleged purchases represented 90% of the "sales." Id. at 106167.
" Id. at 1074.
= Id.
227 Id. at 1062-63.
21 Id. at 1080.
21
2'

= Id.
Id. n.118. The court relied on Derry v. Peek [1889], 14 A.C. 337. See note 213
supra, and Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). Ultramaresis
normally cited for the proposition that an action for deceit founded on negligence
would not lie at common law. See Haimoff, supra note 213, at 155. However, the
McClean court relied on additional language in Ultramaresstating that the "[fraud]
includes the pretense of knowledge when knowledge there is none," 255 N.Y. at 179,
174 N.E. at 444, for the proposition that statements made in reckless disregard for the
truth would sustain a common law deceit action.
" 420 F. Supp. at 1081-82, citing Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir.
1975); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
21
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The Herzfeld and McClean decisions indicate that courts faced
with Rule 10b-5 private damage actions will look increasingly to the
common law of fraud and deceit to determine the standard of culpability appropriate to sustain liability." 2 This development is consonant with the mandate of Ernst & Ernst. The Supreme Court there
evinced an intent to halt the loosening of Rule 10b-5 liability standards that was fully consistent with the common law.m However, to
interpret Ernst & Ernst as eliminating Rule 10b-5 liability for reckless conduct would be to make the rule less protective than the common law. The effect would be to give those involved in securities
transactions a disincentive to be diligent and seek out the truth. 4
The Ernst & Ernst Court probably did not intend this result, and the
Herzfeld and McClean courts properly avoided developing such a
doctrine absent express direction from the Supreme Court.
D. Plaintiff'sDuty of Due Care
Private actions under Rule 10b-5 are a judicial creation.25 In tailoring the scope of these actions, courts have emphasized definition
of the affirmative elements of the plaintiffs case more than the assessment of the scope of possible defenses to Rule 10b-5 claims? 81 In
recent years, however, the upsurge of litigation under Rule 10b-523
23

See note 213 supra.An indication that courts after Ernst & Ernst will treat Rule

10b-5 actions as analogous to fraud actions is the recent tendency to require Rule 10b5 plaintiffs to comply with the requirement of FED. R. Civ. P. Rule 9(b) that fraud be
alleged with particularity. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Kendrick, [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,853 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1977) (sufficient allegation of scienter); Schmeidler v. Lazard Freres & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) %95,834 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1977) (insufficient particularity
in alleging scienter).
2 See Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); Haimoff, supra
note 213; note 230 supra.
23 See Haimoff, supra note 213, at 156; 1975-1976Developments, supra note 5, at
942-43.
211 See text accompanying notes 95-97 supra.
29 See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, (1976) (materiality
standard); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (culpability standard);
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (protected class); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (causation standard); Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (private right of action
implied). See generally Wheeler, Plaintiff's Duty of Due Care Under Rule 10b-5: An
Implied Defense To An Implied Remedy, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 561, 561-63 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Wheeler].
23 See A. BROMBERG, supra note 55 § 2.5(b), stating that, "IOb-5 is generating
almost as much litigation as all the other antifraud. provisions together, and several
times as much as the express liabilities."
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has given rise to a corresponding development of options for Rule 10b5 defendants. 238 Various courts have allowed proof of laches, 2 9
waiver,2 410 estoppel,211 ratification,24 2 in pari delicto, 2 3 and collateral
estoppe1244 to bar recovery under Rule 10b-5.
A more recent development favorable to Rule 10b-5 defendants
has been the judicial imposition of a duty of due care upon investors
2" See generally Bromberg, Are There Limits to Rule 10b-5?, 29 Bus. LAW. 167
(Special Issue March 1974); Jacobs, Affirmative Defenses To Securities ExchangeAct
Rule I0b-5 Actions, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 857 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Jacobs,
Defenses]; Ruder & Cross, Limitationson Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 1972 DuKE
L.J. 1125; Wheeler, note 236 supra.
21 See, e.g., Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 1970),
modifying, 283 F. Supp. 417, 428-29 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718,
740-41 n.15 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). Laches is a defense only
to equitable claims. The court in Hecht set out the elements of laches as "(1) lack of
diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the
party asserting the defense." 430 F.2d at 1208.
240See, e.g., Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 1964).
The Royal Air court defined waiver as the voluntary relinquishment of a known right.
Royal Air involved alleged misrepresentations in a face to face sale of stock. The
defense of waiver was held to be unavailable because the plaintiff had not learned the
facts regarding the claimed misrepresentation until after the act alleged to have constituted a waiver. Id.
211See, e.g., Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 1974); Hecht v.
Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 1970) (estoppel for Rule 10b-5
purposes defined in common law terms; party with knowledge of facts estopped to deny
that knowledge when he acts with intent to influence party asserting estoppel to rely
detrimentally upon those actions).
242 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 369 F. Supp. 1099, 1101 (N.D.
Tex. 1974) (ratification validates a prior act). In Ferguson, a brokerage customer continued to do business with the brokerage firm even after receiving confirmation slips
that revealed the defendant's violations of the securities laws.
243 See, e.g., James v. DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155, 158 (5th Cir. 1974). But see Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See generally Bell,
How to Bar an Uninnocent Investor-The Validity of Common Law Defenses to Private Actions Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1970);
Ruder, supra note 179.
21"See, e.g., Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806, 810 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971). Unlike collateral estoppel however, res judicata is normally not considered a defense in Rule 10b-5 cases. State courts lack jurisdiction to decide Rule 10b-5 claims, and common law actions arising out of facts which
give rise to a Rule 10b-5 action are considered separate causes of action. See, e.g.,
Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d 994, 997 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975);
Abramson v. Pennwood Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1968). Contra, Connelly
v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 55-60 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd per curiam, 279 F.2d 685
(6th Cir. 1960) (state common law claim and Rule 10b-5 claim held same cause of
action; therefore, res judicata defense appropriate). See generally Jacobs, Defenses,
supra note 238, at 905-08.
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claiming under Rule 10b-5. 245 Courts which have imposed this duty
have not reached uniform conclusions as to the proper role for the
plaintiff's duty of due care in Rule 10b-5 actions. 2 1 Some courts have
treated this duty as a separate element of the plaintiffs prima facie
case under Rule 10b-5.2 7 The most common treatment of the plaintiff's duty of due care, however, has been as an affirmative defense
analogous to contributory negligence. 2 1 Viewed in this manner, the
continued validity of the defense is questionable given the Supreme
Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.245 Because negligence
is no longer an adequate basis for recovery under Rule 10b-5,25 apparently contributory negligence likewise can no longer bar recovery."'
This view is supported by the degree to which a breach of Rule 10b-5
after Ernst & Ernst resembles common law fraud,2 2 where the plain11 See generally Wheeler, supra note 236; Note, The Due Diligence Requirement
for Plaintiffs Under Rule 10b-5, 1975 DuKn L.J. 753 [hereinafter cited as Due
Diligence].There is no uniformity in the cases or the literature as to the name to give
to this implied defense based on the plaintiff's conduct. Due diligence, contributory
negligence and duty of due care have all been employed. Possibly the "duty of due
care" terminology should be used because of its relative freedom from prior content
and connotations-a useful attribute for a doctrine which remains ambiguous, pending
further judicial analysis. Wheeler, supra note 236, at 563 n.7.
216 Compare Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 420 (6th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff's duty of care incorporated into scope of defendant's duty to disclose-no duty to
disclose readily available information) with Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434
F.2d 100, 103 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971) (plaintiff's duty of due
care treated as an affirmative defense-expressly analogized to contributory negligence); and City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 905 (1970) (duty of due care incorporated into plaintiff's prima facie
case-plaintiff carries the burden of proving reasonable investigation).
2I See City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230 n.10 (8th Cir. 1970)
(Rule 10b-5 protects only "conscientious buyers and sellers in good faith"). The effect
of the Vanderboom court's analysis is to treat the question of whether the defendant
has violated Rule 10b-5 in terms of the plaintiff's conduct. Wheeler, supra note 236 at
589-90.
2 One commentator has argued that the plaintiffs duty of due care should be
treated as an affirmative defense because the defendant's violation of Rule 10b-5 is
independent of any particular plaintiff's right to recovery, thus the defendant remains
liable in a public action. This analysis avoids confusing the questions of whether
plaintiff did rely and whether he should have relied on the defendant's representations.
Wheeler, supra note 236, at 591-96.
243 425 U.S. 185 (1976), see text accompanying notes 171-177 supra.
- 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
21 See A. BROMBERG, supra note 55, at § 8.4 (652) (duty of due care imposed on
plaintiff primarily by courts which have held defendant to a negligence standard). A.
FLEISCHER, R. MUNDHEIM, & B. VANDEGRIFT (eds.), EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION (1976) at 257-58.
212Assuming that Ernst & Ernst does not bar Rule 10b-5 liability for a statement
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tiff's negligence was irrelevant.23 One important countervailing argument, however, is that imposition of a duty of due care upon investors
serves to encourage investor caution.24 Thus, the Ernst & Ernst decision should not necessarily eliminate the plaintiffs duty of due care
as a factor in Rule 10b-5 actions. Two courts have recently considered
the question of whether actions under Rule 10b-5 are now so closely
analogous to common law fraud as to preclude a defense founded on
the plaintiffs lack of due care or whether such a defense could still
be justified on other grounds despite apparent inconsistency with the
common law.25
In Holdsworth v. Strong'6 (Holdsworth II) the Tenth Circuit on
rehearing en banc reversed a pre-Ernst & Ernst panel decision27
(Holdsworth I) which had upheld the duty of due care as a required
element of the plaintiff's case, despite terming the defendant's conduct "primarily intentional." ' 5 Holdsworth involved a business venmade in reckless disregard for the truth, see text accompanying notes 212-234, supra,
the scope of Rule 10b-5 liability after Ernst & Ernst is largely parallel to the scope of
common law deceit. In common law actions factually analogous to Ernst & Ernst,
negligent misrepresentations or omissions would not support liability. See PROSSER,
supra note 102, § 107 at 704-10. Reckless misrepresentations or omissions however,
would provide the basis for liability at common law. A defendant who spoke with
reckless disregard for the truth or with no belief in the truth of his assertions was liable
at common law and would apparently also be liable in a post-Ernst & Ernst Rule 10b5 action. See Haimoff, supra note 213 at 162; 25 EMORY L.J. 465, 472 (1976).
A plaintiff was barred from recovering in a common law fraud action only if
the statement on which he relied was "so patently ridiculous as to be unbelievable"-a
far higher standard than negligence or a duty of due care. PROSSER, supra note 102, §
108 at 717.
' See Wheeler, supra note 236 at 600-01.
Straub v. Vaisman & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,623 (3d Cir. June 15, 1976); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.
1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3665 (U.S. April 5, 1977) (No. 76-1119).
Because private actions under Rule 10b-5 are the result of judicial implication, courts
are empowered to define the limits of those actions. Such a definition must effectuate
legislative policy and is not bound by the definition of analogous common law actions.
Thus, given that the fostering of investor caution is a legitimate avenue toward effectuating legislative intent, courts are free to impose a duty of due care as. a means to
that end without regard to the limits of the common law. See Due Diligence, supra
note 245 at 760-61.
- 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976).
" [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,465 (10th Cir. Feb.
27, 1976).
1 Id. at 99,361-62. The panel decision in Holdsworth (Holdsworth I) rejected as
clearly erroneous the trial court's finding that the plaintiff could not have ascertained
the facts as to the undisclosed information. The court concluded that where the plaintiff had exercised "no diligence," the imposition of a duty of due care as a bar to
recovery was appropriate. Id.
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ture undertaken by three attorneys through the mechanism of a
closely held corporation. 5 The defendant in Holdsworth was the controlling shareholder in the venture and carried on the business operations without significant involvement of or interference from the
other shareholders. Plaintiff, who was both an accountant and an
attorney, alleged that he was induced to sell his shares in the venture
by the defendant's misrepresentations as to the future prospects of
the venture.2 60 The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant had
appropriated corporate funds for personal use and had concealed
these withdrawals with "expense" entries on the corporation's
books.261 The plaintiff in Holdsworth did virtually nothing to protect
his own interests. Despite the fact that he was a director of the corporation, he never inspected the books and relied totally on2 the defen2
dant's misrepresentations as to the venture's prospects. 1
The Holdsworth II court rejected the defendant's contention that
the plaintiff should be barred from Rule 10b-5 recovery because of his
lack of due care. 22 Reasoning that it would be inequitable to require
the plaintiff to prove scienter and yet allow his own negligence to bar
recovery, the court held that only a gross lack of due care by the
plaintiff, comparable to scienter on the part of the defendant, would
264
The court buttressed this analysis
bar recovery after Ernst & Ernst.
with a discussion of common law analogs to Rule 10b-5 actions, emphasizing the irrelevancy of the plaintiff's negligence in intentional
21'The venture involved in Holdsworth was a closely held corporation formed to
market a timekeeping system for law offices. Defendant allegedly concealed the venture's success by using his position as operator of the business to misappropriate funds
and make concealing entries on the books. 545 F.2d at 689-91.
20 Id. at 690. Defendant induced plaintiff to sell his shares in the venture by
reporting that the corporation had invaded capital to pay its most recent dividend and
that no dividends would be forthcoming in the foreseeable future. Id.
2"I Id. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had appropriated the bulk of
$96,000 in gross receipts and disbursed these to his family, his law firm and other
business ventures. The spurious "expense" entries on the corporation's books concealed the fact that the venture was a thriving operation.
262Id. at 689-91.
23 Id. at 693-94.
264 Id. at 692-93. The court noted that the defense of lack of due care had been
allowed prior to Ernst & Ernst primarily in cases involving negligent defendants.
Citing White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d
718, 735 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); 2 A. BROMBERO, supra note
55, § 8.4 (652). Given Ernst & Ernst's requirement that intentional conduct be proved
in order to state a Rule 10b-5 claim, the Holdsworth court viewed as questionable a
doctrine that would allow the defendant to avoid liability by claiming that the plaintiff
would not have been cheated had he been careful. 545 F.2d at 693.
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fraud cases.2" 5 The court did not, however, treat plaintiff's lack of due
care as irrelevant. Rather, the Tenth Circuit viewed the due care
issue as an element of the "justifiable reliance" which formed the
causal link between the violation and the harm alleged. 26 After reaching this conclusion, however, the court failed to clarify the nature of
the plaintiffs burden in demonstrating his due care as a part of the
2 7
causation element of his claim. 1
In Straub v. Vaisman & Co., Inc.2 11 the Third Circuit employed a
somewhat different analysis to reach a result similar to that in
Holdsworth I. The defendant in Straub was a broker-dealer whose
misrepresentations and omissions in connection with his recommendation that the plaintiff purchase a certain stock were sufficiently
severe to "shock the conscience" of the court.2 69 The defendant represented the recommended stock as a new issue when it was not. In
addition, the defendant had inside information that bankruptcy was
imminent for the recommended company. Further, the shares sold to
the plaintiff were purchased from a company in which the defendant
owned a controlling interest. Finally, the defendant concealed his
status as a "market maker"n ° for the recommended stock. The plaintiff in Straub had accepted the defendant's recommendation without
any independent investigation." 1 Thus the defendant argued that the
plaintiff had breached his duty of due care and was consequently
barred from recovering under Rule 10b-5. 2
26 Id. at 693-94.
266 Id. at 695-97. See generally Part B, supra.
267 545 F.2d at 697. The Tenth Circuit adopted the trial court's finding of reliance

as reasonable and justifiable. The court stated that the friendship and trust between
the plaintiff and defendant supported the trial court's finding of justifiable reliance
and eliminated the "need for the Holdsworths to show lack of contributory fault"
(emphasis added). Id. This implication that a showing of due care can be considered
an element of a Rule 10b-5 plaintiff's prima facie case appears inconsistent with the
court's earlier characterization of the plaintiff's due care as "irrelevant" after Ernst &
Ernst. See text accompanying notes 281-283 infra.
1" [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,623 (3d Cir. June
15, 1976).
260 Id. at 90,107. The defendant in Straub made his representations through a
fiduciary in whom he knew plaintiff placed complete trust.
210See note 136, supra.
2" The plaintiff in Straub was overseas at all times relevant to the litigation, and
any investigation on his part was thus difficult. However, he took no steps toward any
sort of investigation and failed even to request a prospectus. Rather, the plaintiff took
the defendant's recommendations, made through the plaintiff's adviser, at face value.
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,623 at 90,107-10.
12 Id. at 90,109.
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The Straub court recognized that such a claim of what amounted
to contributory negligence would have had some validity as a bar to
recovery prior to Ernst & Ernst but stated that since defendants
could now be liable only for intentional conduct, the need for a contributory negligence defense was "less compelling. ' '

3

The court none-

theless recognized that the policy of encouraging investor caution
merited consideration even after Ernst & Ernst.74 Balancing that
policy against the common law analogs of Rule 10b-5 actions,2 5 the
Third Circuit applied a facts and circumstances test to evaluate the
scope of the plaintiff's duty of due care. 8 Factors that the court
considered significant in its evaluation included: the existence of a
fiduciary relation between plaintiff and defendants, plaintiff's financial sophistication and opportunity to detect the fraud alleged, the
existence of a longstanding business or personal relation between the
parties, and the plaintiffs access to relevant information.2 7 Applying
this test to the facts of Straub, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff's conduct would not bar his recovery under Rule 10b-5. 5 Nevertheless, the court made clear that the duty of due care was still
23
217

Id. at 90,110.
Id. The court stated that
[t]he analogy to the common law torts [of misrepresentation and
deceit] indicates that since intent to defraud is a necessary element
of a lOb-5 action, the due care defense should be narrowly circumscribed .... However, tort concepts must be balanced against the

policies underlying the federal securities laws and the judicially created causes of action, where encouragement of watchfulness in the
market place has obvious benefits.
21 Id. The Third Circuit questioned treating the plaintiff's due care in a Rule
10b-5 action as totally irrelevant, see Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970), on the ground that such an approach
fails to encourage investor caution. The Straub court, however, was similarly dissatisfied with the position that lack of due care should bar recovery, see Holdsworth I,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. Rap. (CCH) 95,645 (10th Cir. Feb. 27,
1976), because that doctrine provides less protection for gullible investors than does
the common law. The Straub court concluded that these two positions should be
balanced, making the plaintiff's obligation of due care a flexible one, dependent on
the facts and circumstances of each case. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,623 at 90,110. See text accompanying notes 276-278 infra.
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,623 at 90,110.
211
27 [1976-1977 Transfer
Id.
211The plaintiff in Straub was a sophisticated investor, a factor which weighed
against him on the due care question. However, the fact that the plaintiff had no access
to relevant information or opportunity to-detect the fraud as well as the fact that the
defendant made his fraudulent representations through a trusted, longstanding fiduciary of the plaintiff led the court to conclude that the plaintiff's lack of due care
should not bar his recovery. Id. at 90,110-11.
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available as an affirmative defense in the Third Circuit, provided the
9
defendant could satisfy the court's facts and circumstances test.
The Straub opinion represents a well reasoned attempt to balance
the factors and policies involved in the plaintiff's duty of due care
after Ernst & Ernst. The Third Circuit approached the issue clearly
and provided needed guidelines for application lacking in Holdsworth
II.The Straub court expressly set out the competing considerations
involved in the plaintiffs duty of due care and provided a test to
balance those considerations. 2 , In contrast, the HoldsworthII court,
though alluding to the "irrelevancy" '' of the plaintiffs due care after
Ernst & Ernst, nonetheless examined the duty as part of the justifiable reliance element of the plaintiffs case. 2 2 This analysis impliedly
makes the need to show due care a part of the plaintiffs prima facie
case." 3 In addition, the HoldsworthII court provides no guidelines for
determining whether the plaintiff has made a sufficient showing of
due care to fulfill the justifiable reliance element of his case. Further,
the Straub opinion's treatment of the plaintiffs duty of due care as
an affirmative defense is preferable to treating the issue as a part of
the reliance element of the plaintiff's prima facie case.,, The
Holdsworth II court did not specify which party had the burden of
proof on the issue of the plaintiffs diligence, but by treating the
question solely in connection with the "justifiable" reliance element
of the plaintiffs claim, the Tenth Circuit impliedly placed the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate his due care, thereby proving that
his reliance on the alleged misrepresentations was justified.', Therefore, although HoldsworthII contains broad language supporting the
"irrelevancy" of the plaintiffs due care in an intentional fraud case, '
the opinion arguably places a higher burden on a Rule 10b-5 plaintiff
than does the Straub opinion, which expressly recognized the continued validity of the plaintiffs lack of due care as an affirmative defense. The degree to which Holdsworth II imposes such a burden
remains unclear because of the opinion's lack of guidelines for application and its virtually wholesale adoption of the trial court's finding
of reliance.
Id. Accord, Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974).
m See text accompanying notes 275-278 supra.

21

18 See text accompanying notes 265-266 supra.
21 See note 267 supra.
= Id.

m See notes 247-248 supra.
See text accompanying notes 266-267 supra.
545 F.2d at 693-94. See text accompanying notes 265-266, supra.

21
28
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After Ernst & Ernst however, it is difficult to justify the potential
result of the HoldsworthII court's language which burdens the plaintiff with the requirement of demonstrating his due care. Ernst &
Ernst requires the plaintiff to plead and prove scienter. It seems
incongruous to allow a defendant with such a mental state embracing
a "willful intent to defraud"27 an opportunity to escape liability because a plaintiff fails to meet an ill-defined, additional burden of
demonstrating due care in making the investment decision involved.
The Straub court's approach of treating the issue as an affirmative
defense evinces a recognition of this incongruity and places the burden of showing lack of due care on the defendant. This placement of
the burden of proof together with guidelines drawn in light of Ernst
& Ernst-outlining the scope of that burden renders the Straub interpretation a more satisfactory attempt to balance the conflicting considerations present with regard to the plaintiff's duty of due care after
Ernst & Ernst; that while conscious wrongdoers should not escape
liability there is a need to foster investor caution.
E. Rule 10b-5 and Internal CorporateAffairs
Commentators have argued that the securities laws constitute, or
should be interpreted to constitute, a body of substantive federal
corporate law. Yet, until very recently, courts have generally interpreted those laws as aiming solely at the prevention of securities
fraud by compelling full and fair disclosure.29 Under this view of the
scope of the securities laws, the fiduciary obligations of corporate
officers, directors, insiders and controlling persons have been considered state law concerns. 21 In Santa Fe Industries,Inc. v. Green2 1 the
425 U.S. at 193.
Debate has been especially addressed to the scope of Rule 10b-5. See, e.g.,
Jacobs, The Role of SecuritiesExchangeAct Rule 10b-5 in the Regulationof Corporate
Mismanagement, 59 CoRNELL L. REv. 27 (1973); Painter, note 127 supra; Note, The
ControllingInfluence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86
HARv. L. REv. 1007 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Controlling Influence]. This view of
the reach of the securities laws has found some support outside the confines of academia. See, e.g., Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961) (opinion of Commissioner Cary). But cf. Cary, note 91 supra (inappropriate to regulate all types of corporate transactions under the securities laws as presently written).
119See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); 89 HARv.L. REv.
1917, 1918 (1976).
210 See Bromberg, Are There Limits to Rule 10b.5?, 29 Bus. LAw. 166, 168 (Special
Issue March 1974); 89 HARv. L. REv. 1917, 1926 (1975). But cf. ControllingInfluence,
supra note 288, at 1009 (exertion of controlling insider influence to cause a corporation
to enter an unfair securities transaction termed a Rule 10b-5 violation).
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Supreme Court defined the proper role of Rule 10b-5 in the internal
affairs of publicly held corporations. The Court held in Santa Fe that,
absent a showing of deception or use of a manipulative device,292 no
action would lie under Rule 10b-5 for an alleged breach of an internal
corporate fiduciary duty.29 3 With this holding, the Court continued its
recent pattern of restricting the growth of Rule 10b-5294 and apparently repudiates the doctrine that the securities laws as presently
written2 5 provide the basis for a body of substantive federal corporate
law.
Santa Fe involved a minority shareholder challenge to a "going
private ' 296 transaction. Majority shareholders sought to merge a pubM997 S. Ct. 1292 (1977).
See text accompanying notes 305-314 infra.
23 The Supreme Court's ruling in Santa Fe also implicitly reverses another recent
Second Circuit decision, Marshel v. AFW Fabric Co., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), vacated
and remanded for consideration of mootness, 45 U.S.L.W. 3273 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1976),
noted at 64 CALIF. L. REv. 1184 (1976); 89 HARV. L. REv. 1917 (1976). Marshel involved
a conventional merger of Concord Fabrics, a publicly held company, into AFW Fabric
Corp., a shell corporation created by Concord's controlling shareholders solely for the
purpose of effectuating the merger. Under the terms of the merger agreement, minority
shareholders of Concord would be forced to exchange their shares for cash. The proxy
statements soliciting approval of the merger expressly stated that the sole reason for
the merger was to convert Concord into a privately held company. Minority shareholders challenged the merger as a fraudulent transaction under Rule 10b-5. The Second
Circuit reversed a lower court dismissal and held that the elimination of minority
shareholders for no legitimate corporate purpose, accomplished through the purchase
of securities, constituted a sufficient basis for a claim under Rule 10b-5. 533 F.2d at
1280-81. The court based its holding on the fact that the controlling shareholders had
used corporate funds to finance a transaction that benefited only themselves. This
misappropriation of corporate funds for private gain, combined with the fact that the
purchase and sale of securities was at the heart of the transaction, was found sufficient
to state a claim of fraud under Rule 10b-5 notwithstanding full disclosure. Id.
211See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft, Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723 (1975).
' See note 329 infra.
A "going private" transaction is one whose ultimate goal is the elimination of
public ownership of a corporation and the continuation of the corporation's activities
as a closely held company. See generally Brudney, A Note on "Going Private," 61 VA.
L. REv. 1019 (1975); Green, Corporate Freeze-Out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28
STA. L. REv. 487 (1976); Note, Going Private,84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975). Often the first
step in the process of going private involves a cash tender offer or an offer to exchange
a debt security for outstanding shares whereby minority shareholders are asked to
relinquish voluntarily their corporate ownership. See Soloman, Going Private: Business Practices, Legal Mechanics, Judicial Standards and Proposals for Reform, 25
BUFFALO L. Rv. 141, 148-49 (1976). The goal of such tender offers is to either reduce
the number of stockholders, allowing a delisting of the corporation under the '34 Act,
212
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licly held company into a privately held shell corporation by means
of a Delaware short form merger.297 Minority shareholders declined to
assert their exclusive state remedy of appraisal 9 and instead chal§ 12(g)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(4) (1970) (registration of any class of securities may be
terminated if less than three hundred persons are holders of record) or to increase the
majority's share of ownership, thereby facilitating going private through the use of
state merger statutes. Merger statutes generally provide for mergers upon approval of
a simple or two-thirds majority of all stockholders or, when a parent corporation owns
a specified percentage of a subsidiary's outstanding stock, simply upon approval of the
board of directors of the parent. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 251 (Cum. Supp.
1976) (simple majority approval required) with N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 903 (1963)
(McKinney) (two-thirds approval required) and NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2074 (1974) (only
parent board approval required if subsidiary 80% owned) and ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 32,
§ 157.66a (Cum. Supp. 1976) (only parent board approval required if subsidiary 99%
owned). Minority shareholders are forced from corporate ownership by the terms of the
merger agreement which generally limit these unwanted shareholders to a cash settlement for their stock.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 253 (1974) allows a parent corporation which owns at
least 90% of the stock of a subsidiary to effect a merger with that subsidiary simply
by filing a resolution of the parent's board of directors and shareholders. No premerger
notice is required, nor does any provision of the statute require a business purpose for
a short form merger. The statute provides that merger terms may provide for payment
of the minority in cash, securities or other rights. The minority's sole remedy if dissatisfied with the terms of the proposed merger is to seek appraisal in state court. See note
298 infra.
The plaintiffs in Santa Fe were minority shareholders in Kirby Lumber Co., which
was 95% controlled by Santa Fe Industries, Inc. Santa Fe sought to freeze out the
minority by first forming a shell corporation, Forest Products, Inc. and transferring to
it all of Santa Fe's Kirby stock in exchange for all of Forest Product's stock. Forest
Products thereby became a "parent" of Kirby, and Santa Fe used its control of Forest
Products to effect a short form merger of Kirby and Forest Products, requiring minority shareholders of Kirby to exchange their shares for cash.
"I The plaintiffs in Santa Fe initially petitioned for appraisal, but withdrew that
action almost immediately and instead sought relief under Rule 10b-5. 97 S. Ct. at 1297
n.4. The proxy materials in Santa Fe valued Kirby's stock at $125 per share. This
appraisal, provided in an opinion by Morgan Stanley & Co., was supported by detailed
historical and financial data estimating the fair market value of Kirby's assets. See
Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). A challenge of
such an offer in an appraisal proceeding is difficult. A dissatisfied shareholder must
retain a comparable array of experts to contest the majority's figures. Further, Delaware law provides that an appraisal claim must demonstrate a "gross undervaluation
. . . shocking to the court's conscience" in order to prevail. Stauffer v. Standard
Brands, Inc., 178 A.2d 311, 314 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct.
1962). In addition, the focus of the appraisal remedy is solely retrospective. A minority
shareholder may recover only the amount by which he can demonstrate his shares were
undervalued as of the time of the merger. A successful appraisal plaintiff does not
participate in any gain anticipated from the merger. This limitation of the appraisal
remedy has been widely criticized. See Brudney & Chirelstein, FairShares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. Rav. 297 (1975); Rosenfeld, An Essay in
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lenged the merger under Rule 10b-5 on the grounds that the merger
terms undervalued their shares, that no advance disclosure of the
merger had been made, and that the merger itself defrauded minority
shareholders because it was performed without a legitimate corporate
purpose .5

Reversing a district court dismissal of these claims, 00 the Second
Circuit held that the lack of any legitimate corporate purpose for the
short form merger was a sufficient basis for a Rule 10b-5 claim.310 The
court of appeals stressed the alleged breach of the majority shareholders' fiduciary obligation of fair dealing to the minority and characterized the consummation of a short term merger without a legitimate
corporate purpose as a fraudulent scheme prohibited by Rule 10b-5.101
Support of the Second Circuit'sDecisions in Marshel v. AFW FabricCorp. and Green
v. Santa Fe Industries,5 HOFSTRA L. Rzv. 111, 124-26 (1976).
21 97 S. Ct. at 1297-99.
1 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The
district court dismissed the action because the plaintiff failed to allege any misrepresentation or omission in connection with the challenged transaction.
"1 533 F.2d at 1291. By its terms, the Second Circuit's holding in SantaFe reached
only going private transactions effected by means of a short form merger. However,
the Second Circuit clearly did not view such a transaction as the limit of the reach of
Rule lob-5 in internal corporate affairs. Five days before the Second Circuit decision
in Santa Fe, another panel of the Second Circuit had applied a business purpose test
to a going private transaction effected by means of a conventional merger. Marshel v.
AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976). See note 293 supra. Further, while
some courts have declined to extend Santa Fe and Marshel beyond the going private
context, see, e.g., Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
45 U.S.L.W. 3665 (U.S. April 5, 1977) (No. 76-5) (successful tender offeror held not to
violate Rule 10b-5 by carrying out announced intention to reduce dividends, Marshel
and Santa Fe held limited to going private transactions); Vernon J. Rockler v. Minneapolis Shareholders Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
95,857 (D. Minn. Jan. 13, 1977) (tender offer alleged to have no corporate purpose held
not to violate Rule 10b-5; expansive view of Marshel and Santa Fe rejected), the
Second Circuit's holding in Santa Fe clearly had implications beyond going private
transactions. See Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976) (business
purpose test applied to 10b-5 shareholder derivative action not involving going private). If, as the Second Circuit held, a breach of a fiduciary duty of fair dealing running
from majority to minority shareholders also gives rise to a Rule 10b-5 claim, then the
whole range of internal corporate fiduciary duties would also fall within the purview
of Rule 10b-5. Thus, the Supreme Court's reversal of Santa Fe goes beyond the question of whether Rule 10b-5 reaches going private transactions and may effectively
dispose of the contention that a body of substantive corporate law can be implied from
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See text accompanying notes 328-329 infra.
302533 F.2d at 1289-91. See generallyNote, The Second Circuit Adopts a Business
Purpose Test For Going Private: Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa
Fe Industries, Inc., 64 CAUF. L. REv. 1184, 1191-92 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Business Purpose Test].
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The court stated that its holding that Rule 10b-5 imposed a business
purpose test 3 on going private transactions demonstrated that neither misrepresentation nor nondisclosure was a necessary element of
a Rule l0b-5 cause of action." 4
In overturning the Second Circuit's decision the Supreme Court
placed primary reliance on the language of section 10(b) of the '34

Act. 3 5 Stating that the language of section 10(b) must control the

interpretation of Rule 10b-5300 the court held that the statute contains
no indication of any congressional intent to reach conduct not involving manipulation or deception.3"7 Thus, the Court held that no fiduciary duty could be implied under Rule 10b-5 which prohibited conduct not manipulative or deceptive within the meaning of section
10(b).308

The Court then turned to the facts alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint to determine if the conduct involved was manipulative or deceptive." 9 The notice of the merger had, the Court found, fairly presented the plaintiffs with the choice of accepting the price offered for
their shares or seeking appraisal in the Delaware courts, together with
all the information necessary to make that choice.310 Thus, the majorThe business purpose test of Marshel and Santa Fe was criticized as unworkable during the period between those decisions and the Supreme Court's reversal of
Santa Fe. Virtually any corporate transaction may have numerous purposes, some
legitimate, some less so. Recognizing the difficulty of balancing these purposes and
determining the "dominant motivation" for a transaction, a panel of the Second Circuit different from the panels that decided Marshel and Santa Fe declined to apply •
the rationale of those cases to a transaction which it found did not present a "stark"
example of the use of corporate funds for a "purely personal benefit." Merrit v. Libby,
McNeill & Libby, 533 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1976). Very few transactions would provide
such a "stark" example, and even those that did could often be disguised with appropriately worded corporate minutes and memos. See 89 HARv. L. REv. 1917, 1930-32
(1976). Thus, even before the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe, the broad applicability and utility of the business purpose test had been questioned.
" 533 F.2d at 1287. The Second Circuit stated that it wished to remove, any
"lingering doubts" as to whether misrepresentation or nondisclosure were essential
elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim. Id.
m 97 S. Ct. at 1299-1301.
See note 174, supra.

97 S. Ct. at 1300-01. The Santa Fe Court relied heavily on the statutory analysis
employed in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) see note 174 supra.
'

m' 97 S. Ct. at 1301-02.
09Id.

110Id. The plaintiffs in Santa Fe also argued that the failure to give them advance
notice of the merger was a material nondisclosure in violation of Rule 10b-5 even
though no such disclosure was required by Delaware law. The majority summarily
rejected this claim and held that no material non-disclosure had occurred. The Court
supported this reasoning by noting that even had the prior notice been given, the
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ity concluded that no deception was present in the transaction challenged in Santa Fe.31 ' Addressing the further question of whether the
conduct alleged was "manipulative" within the meaning of section
10(b), the Court focused on the technical construction given to that
term in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.321 The Court there held that
"manipulative" is "virtually a term of art" as used in section 10(b)
and solely encompasses conduct aimed at artificially affecting securities prices. 313 Based on this reading of the statutory language, the
Santa Fe Court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that corporate mismanagement claims alleging unfair treatment of minority shareholders fall within the scope of section 10(b) .31
In addition to the statutory language, the majority posed several
further justifications for its holding in Santa Fe.31 1 The Court first
argued that because private actions under Rule 10b-5 are creatures
of judicial implication, 3 6 the reach of these actions should be limited
to the extent necessary to effectuate Congress' purpose in adopting
the '34 Act. That purpose was to insure full and fair disclosure in
securities transactions,"7 and the Court found that if full disclosure
is made, the fairness of a transaction is "at most a tangential concern
of the statute. 3 18 Thus, the Court declined to imply a private right
plaintiffs' exclusive remedy under Delaware law would still have been appraisal. 97 S.
Ct. at 1301 n.14, citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). See
note 298 supra.
'" 97 S.Ct. at 1301-02. The Court distinguished the cases relied upon by the
plaintiffs including Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972);
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 9 (1971); and Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 212, 220 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969),
on the basis that each had involved some element of deception. 97 S.Ct. at 1301-02,
n. 15.
312 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See Part C supra.
425 U.S. at 199-200.
"t 97 S.Ct. at 1302. The Court stated that:
[W]e do not think [Congress] would have chosen this "term of art"
(manipulative) if it had meant to bring within the scope of § 10(b)
instances of corporate mismanagement such as this, in which the
essence of the compalint is that shareholders were treated unfairly by
a fiduciary.
",Id. at 1302-04. Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined only in that portion of
the Court's opinion which rested on the statutory language of § 10(b). See text accompanying notes 305-314 supra.
316 See note 99 supra.

3,97 S. Ct. at 1302-03, citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 151 (1972), quoting, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
186 (1963).
31897 S. Ct. at 1303.
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beyond Congress' principal objective in
of action which reached
31 9
adopting section 10(b).
Finally, the Court noted that substantive corporate law has been
traditionally a matter for state regulation as an additional argument
for rejecting the implication of substantive intra-corporate fiduciary
duties under Rule 10b-5.3 10 The majority declined to create such a
body of federal corporate law because of the danger of vexatious
litigation arising from any expansion of the class of plaintiffs entitled
to claim under Rule 10b-5.3 21 Further, the Santa Fe Court was reluctant to override and interfere with state regulation of corporate affairs
given the absence of any express congressional intent that the securities laws should be so extended.3 2 The Court recognized the possibility that uniform federal fiduciary standards may be necessary to
govern going private transactions,3 2s but nevertheless held that Rule
32
10b-5 should not be extended to imply those standards. '
The Court's holding in SantaFe is fully consonant with the recent
trend in its decisions in securities cases. Given the preeminent status
assigned to the statutory language of section 10(b) by Ernst & Ernst
and the manner in which the Court's opinion in that case construed
the terms "deceptive and manipulative," a fully disclosed short form
merger in compliance with state law seems clearly beyond the pale
of Rule 10b-5.3 1 Further, the fear of "strike" suits and vexatious
311Id. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78-80 (1975).
1" 97 S. Ct. at 1303, citing, Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 949
(1977).
1' 97 S. Ct. at 1303. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
12 97 S. Ct. at 1303-04.
" Id. at 1304.
3' Id. n.17, quoting, Cary, supra note 91, at 700, "it seems anomalous to jigsaw
every kind of corporate dispute into the federal courts through the securities acts as
they are presently written" (urging a "frontal attack" on the need for federal fudiciary
standards by means of a Federal Corporate Minimum Standards Act). See note 329
infra.
m But see Haimoff, supra note 213, at 170-73. Haimoff contends that because a
fiduciary relationship enables majority shareholders to misappropriate minority's
shares without "overt fraud" would not absolve a fiduciary at common law, and that
nothing in Ernst & Ernst is contrary to this result under Rule 10b-5. However, this
argument is misconceived. Ernst & Ernst involved the language of § 10(b) on the
question of the requisite standard of culpability in private actions under Rule 10b-5.
The Ernst & Ernst Court concluded that because of the statutory language, no action
would lie under Rule 10b-5 for a mere negligent violation of the Rule. This decision
incidentally imposed a standard of culpability in Rule 10b-5 cases apparently identical
to that imposed in common law deceit actions. See text accompanying notes 232-234
supra. This reasoning, however, merely assigns a pre-eminent status to the statutory
language; it does not render Rule 10b-5 a codification of the common law of deceit.

936

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIV

litigation evinced in Blue Chip Stamps v. ManorDrug Stores326 would
likewise have been violated by the extension of Rule 10b-5 to encompass intracorporation fiduciary duties. Finally, the Court's solicitude
for state corporate law, recently expressed in Piper v. Chris Craft
Industries,Inc."7 could not have been squared with the imposition of
a supervening body of federal corporate law.
Santa Fe apparently represents the death knell for judicial implication of substantive federal corporate law from the language of the
securities laws. 311 The Supreme Court's position is apparently that
the creation of such a body of law is properly a subject for legislative
and not judicial action. Thus, the rise of substantive federal corporate
See text accompanying notes 102-104 supra. If the statutory language dictates a conclusion different from that reached in analogous common law actions, the mandate of
Ernst & Ernst is that the statutory language must control, not that the common law
has been codified. The common law of deceit is merely a useful analog and is not
determinative as to the substantive rules governing Rule 10b-5 actions.
326421 U.S. 723 (1975). See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
- 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977). See generally Tender Offers, infra Section IV, 943.
32' See Note, Judicial Retrenchment Under Rule 10b-5: An End to the Rule as
Law?, 1976 DUKE L.J. 789, 800-06, One possible argument for the proposition that the
securities laws may still support a body of substantive corporate law even after Santa
Fe is a contention that Santa Fe turned solely on the language of § 10(b) of the '34
Act.
The bulk of the Santa Fe opinion, concurred in by eight Justices, concerned the
language of § 10(b) and the limitation of violations to "deceptive" or "manipulative"
conduct. Justice White, writing for the Court, made it clear that this analysis alone
was sufficient to support the result in Santa Fe., 97 S. Ct. at 1302. Thus, Part IV of
the Santa Fe opinion wherein the Court discusses the dangers of vexatious litigation
arising out of a broadened class of potential Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs and the traditional
state nature of substantive corporate law is arguably dictum. Reasoning from this
conclusion, other provisions of the securities laws not limited to prohibiting deceptive
or manipulative conduct could perhaps support the imposition of federal fiduciary
duties. Provisions sometimes proposed as vehicles for the creation of such standards
are Rule 14a-9, the antifraud provision of the proxy rules, and § 14(e) of the '34 Act
governing proxies. See Bauman, supra note 5, at 351-52; Jennings, Federalizationof
Corporate Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 Bus. LAw. 991, 1013-19 (1976). Duties
implied under these provisions would not have changed the result in Santa Fe which
did not involve the use of proxies, but would affect a broad range of corporate transactions, albeit not so broad a range as § 10(b). An additional provision often posed as a
means to create some federal intra-corporate fiduciary duties is § 17(a) of the '33 Act,
which contains language almost identiccl to that of Rule 10b-5. See note 198 supra.
An obstacle to the use of § 17(a) is the uncertainty as to whether a private right of
action exists under that section. Compare Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 509 F.2d 1287,
1293 n.6 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976) (issue still open); with
Newman v. Prior, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FEa. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,211 (4th
Cir. 1975) (private right of action implied under § 17(a)) and Reid v. Mann, 381 F.
Supp. 525 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (no private right of action finder § 17(a)).
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law must, under the doctrines presently espoused by the Supreme
Court, await the action of Congress. 29 After Santa Fe, the reach of
Rule 10b-5 will be limited to compelling full disclosure of securities
transactions but will not extend to require fairness or a legitimate
corporate purpose for a transaction involving the purchase or sale of
securities.
E. TOWNES DUNCAN
There have been a number of proposals as to the form which this legislative
federalization of corporate law should take. One proposal is the ALI's Federal Securities Code, which would codify many of the judicial developments under the present
securities laws. See Loss, Wrap Up, 31 Bus. LAW. 1193, 1196-97 (1976). However the
business purpose-fairness obligation implied under Rule 10b.5 by the Second Circuit
in Santa Fe would not be codified in the ALI Code as it presently stands, although
the Code would leave courts free to adopt the Second Circuit's approach. Id. at 1197.
ALI FEDERAL SEcurrms CODE, Revised comments to § 1303, comment (5)(C) at 10406 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-3, 1974). Section 1303 of the proposed Code was drafted prior
to the lower court decision in Santa Fe. See generally Loss, The American Law Institute's FederalSecurities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAw. 27 (1969). Another tactic, which
has gained popular credence in recent years, is straightforward federal chartering of
corporations above a given size. See generally R. NADER, M. GREN & L. SEUGHMAN,
CONsTrmIoNALIzING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT
CORPORATIONS (1976); Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31
Bus. LAw. 1125 (1976). Finally, Professor Cary has proposed the adoption of a Federal
Corporate Minimum Standards Act which would set basic federal requirements for
state corporation law. See Cary, A Proposed Federal CorporateMinimum Standards
Act, 29 Bus. LAw. 1101 (1974); Cary, supra note 91, at 696-705. Several of Professor
Cary's proposed minimum standards would be significant in a situation such as that
presented in Santa Fe, including federal fiduciary standards for directors and controlling shareholders and a provision prescribing fairness as a prerequisite for transactions
involving interested directors or controlling shareholders. See Cary, supra note 91, at
702. But see Drexler, Federalismand CorporateLaw: A MisguidedMissile, 3 SEC. REG.
L.J. 374 (1976) (present Delaware law provides adequate protection for all interests);
Henning, Federalism and CorporateLaw: The Chaos Inherent in the Cary Proposal,3
SEC. REG. L.J. 362 (1976) (accepts some of Cary's criticisms, but poses a dual federalstate system of corporate chartering as a means better suited to deal with the problems). Absent congressional action, after Santa Fe, the regulation of intra-corporate
fiduciary duties will apparently remain within the domain of state law. While some
commentators have decried state law as providing inadequate protection for minority
interests, see Cary, supra note 91, there are indications that state courts may now be
inclined to provide closer scrutiny of majority actions in going private as well as other
corporate transactions. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
No. 422 at E-1 (Del. Sup. Ct. Sept. 23, 1977); Tanzer Economic Assocs., Inc. v.
Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc.2d "167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1976) (statutorily authorized merger still open to challenge on fairness
grounds). See generally Note, Going Private: Who Shall Provide the Remedies, 51 ST.
JOHNS L REv. 131 (1977),

